The New Syrian Army: Structure and Commanders
A first look at how Damascus is rebuilding the country's army
Edited April 15: Updated 76th Division, 70th Division, 60th Division, 52nd Division, and 40th Division, added 98th Division, Damascus Division.
Edited April 19: Updated 40th Division, 52nd Division, 70th Division, 74th Division, 80th Division, added 56th Division, 72nd Division
Managing the many independent and semi-loyal factions of Syria’s opposition has been one of, if not the most, defining challenges of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s post-Assad governance-building project. Security operations are conducted at two levels: the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Interior is a much more centrally-commanded and fully formed institution compared to the Ministry of Defense, which is still trying to merge all armed factions under its single command. The failure to control all armed factions has not only enabled widespread abuses and violations by some of these factions, it has also burdened the Ministry of Interior units trying to impose order but who lack any legal authority over what are nominally army units.
Ministry of Interior units (police and General Security (GSS)) are generally speaking legacy HTS and Salvation Government formations, at least at the leadership level. Locally, all police and GSS units fall under the command of the mudir mantiqa, or Regional Director, who all have roots in Idlib’s SSG political or police offices. These close ties to the pre-December leadership has resulted in the Ministry of Interior appearing to have better command over its units, who in turn have an overall better track record of professionalism, than the country’s military units.
The new Ministry of Defense, led by HTS’s Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, called on all factions to dissolve at the end of January, submitting themselves to the ministry and being reformed into a new army. While a dozen or so factions announced their dissolution - including HTS - this was almost entirely a symbolic process. Those factions that did “dissolve” seem to have largely been merged under new divisions, kept intact for the most part but at least submitting to a new chain of command that ties them directly under the ministry.
However by and large, most armed groups have not merged into the new ministry, let alone dissolved. The most outstanding cases remain with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), whose factions retain their own independent revenue streams through both Turkish salaries and years of criminal activity in northern Syria and foreign deployments. These SNA factions, particularly the infamous Suleiman Shah Division “Amshat”, are only nominally under the Ministry of Defense while in reality being powerful enough to exert their own demands on the ministry. This independence is even more pronounces when it comes to the daily violations committed by such factions. GSS units, including in Syria’s coast, that try to prevent faction violations are regularly told “we don’t report to you” while the the Ministry of Defense itself is unable to impose any of its orders.
However, the other group of non-HTS factions, the National Liberation Front (NLF) appears to have more easily, if still not entirely, come under the ministry’s control. These ex-FSA and Islamist factions submitted to HTS political rule in 2018 and 2019, during the last bout of factional infighting in Idlib. In exchange for abandoning their political projects, these factions were able to retain some degree of military autonomy while operating within the HTS-commanded operations rooms and benefiting from the HTS-run Military Academy. These factions have close ties to HTS and this trust is reflected in their current status. Many NLF factions have now adopted division names and regularly refer to themselves as under the Ministry of Defense, have been assigned specific geographic regions in which they support Ministry of Interior units, and others have been formed into new divisions entirely.
No matter how good the ministry’s intentions, the international sanctions on Syria that have prevented any serious investment or foreign cash injections have left the ministry broke. Unable to pay salaries, Damascus has zero leverage over independent armed groups and can provide no incentives for them to abandon what power they currently have, nor can it substantially recruit directly into its own new divisions. None of these factions are strong enough to challenge HTS for the seat of power, but their continued existence as independent armed groups alone is enough to severely undermine Damascus’ authority. Many of these groups took part in this month’s ethnic cleansing retribution campaign against coastal Alawites, and some have for months used their arms to harass and threaten Sunnis and minorities alike in the areas they control.
The new Syrian army thus currently resembles a mix of legacy HTS units, evolved NLF units, SNA factions, and new Ministry of Defense divisions. While many of these new divisions are likely nothing more than bureaucratic suggestions, others have begun to see combat deployments, suggesting there is at least some real structure to them. Most current divisions appear to be built around specific geographies, in the same vein as the pre-2011 Syrian Arab Army. The following sections outline known divisions which claim to operate under the Ministry of Defense in each region, plus three ‘region-less’ divisions. There are some notable geographic gaps, suggesting the existence of additional division not covered here, and of course this does not include all of the other independent or semi-independent armed factions. All of these structures are sure to evolve as the factions and ministry continue to negotiate their futures.
Note: The (name) indicates whether the division is a pre-December HTS, NLF, or SNA faction, while (New+name) indicates from which of these groups the bulk of the newly formed division’s commanders come from.
400th Division (HTS)
Coastal Division (NLF)
56th Reserve Division (New)
76th Division (New+SNA)
80th Division (New+SNA/NLF)
72nd Division (New+SNA)
25th / 82nd Division (New+HTS)
54th Division (New+NLF)
74th Division (New+NLF)
60th Division (NLF)
40th / 44th Division (New+NLF)
70th Division (New+SNA)
77th Division (NLF)
Damascus Division (New)
64th Division (New+NLF)
52nd Division (New+HTS)
118th Division (New+NLF)
42nd Division (New)
66th Division (New+HTS)
62nd Division (SNA)
111th Division (HTS)
128th Division (HTS)
98th Armored Division (New+HTS)
Zubair bin al-Awwam Brigade
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