Remembering Zara: The Legacy of Assad's Violence in the Talkalakh Countryside
The complexities of transitional justice as seen through the experience of one town in Homs
On June 10 a security officer was killed and a second wounded in an attack in the mixed-sect village of Barouha, along the Homs-Lebanon border. Tensions in Barouha were already high following the killing of a young Alawite man two days before, and the vandalizing of an Alawite shrine in December. Pro-government social media quickly accused “regime remnants” of being behind the most recent, while many local Alawite pages accused “criminal gangs” and even local General Security recruits of being involved.
In the chaos that followed the shooting, a family in Barouha was attacked, their home burned down and five members murdered. The next morning, both Alawite and Sunni Facebook pages claimed the victims as their own. Alawite pages claimed the men were killed by security forces, while Sunni pages claimed they were killed by Alawite insurgents. Barouha’s mixed Sunni and Alawite population added to the confusion.
One local man in Barouha told the author that the initial attack on the security checkpoint had been conducted by local smugglers. But the rumors of the involvement of ex-regime insurgents was, according to this man, capitalized on by an influential figure in the nearby town of Zara. According to his account, the man from Zara quickly mobilized around 100 people to storm Barouha and exact revenge against “the insurgents”. Media activists from Zara resolutely reject this accusation.
These competing narratives and their underlying violence are emblematic of the broader crisis in Syria today: maintaining civil peace and building social cohesion in a country where countless war crimes have been committed in every community for 15 years. The government’s current approach seems focused on arresting high level regime war criminals, while not providing any clear guidance on what will happen with the rank-and-file regime supporters who also committed crimes. This has left many Sunni communities unsure if they will ever find justice and Alawites unconvinced that the government can and will protect them from vigilante attacks. The unaddressed sectarian tensions fueled by pro-Assad militias’ war crimes are particularly fierce in towns where most of the population was violently displaced.
Whether or not 100 men from Zara did take up arms against neighboring Alawites the accusation alone underscores the unaddressed crisis in this region: boiling social tensions born out of the crimes committed by local Alawite militiamen against the town of Zara during the war, the violent displacement of Zara’s population in 2014, and the decade of unchecked looting and destruction of their homes and farms by men from the surrounding Alawite villages that followed.
The history of Zara’s revolution and displacement must be preserved and understood, first as a definitive record of what many Sunni communities endured at the hands of a sectarian regime, and secondly as a study in the complexities of maintaining civil peace after Assad. The layers of crimes committed at the hyper-local level and the way these communities have internalized these experiences has created lasting fissures in the social fabrics of every mixed-sect region. Ignoring the impact of this trauma, failing to recognize and memorialize it, and failing to prevent vigilante attacks, will only perpetuate low-level inter-communal violence.
Zara’s Revolution
Three months after Assad’s fall, a new banner was hung over the Homs-Tartous highway. “The Martyrs of Zara Bridge” now decorates the overpass connecting the Sunni Turkmen town of Zara with the city of Talkalakh. Those that hoisted the banner claim it stands for “the more than 500 martyrs” from the town. According to one media activist from Zara, around 120 of these were army defectors and local rebels who died defending the town - the rest were civilians killed in detention or by shelling, sniper attacks, and several massacres during and after the fighting.
Zara sits at the foot of the large mountain overlooking the northern Talkalakh countryside, atop which rests the famous Crusader castle Krak des Chevaliers. The village that formed around this castle, Hosn, is also majority Sunni Turkmen; nearly ever other village around them is Alawite. Together, Zara and Hosn were the last opposition holdouts in Talkalakh. The regime capture of these towns in late March 2014 marked the end of opposition presence in western Homs.
Zara’s history begins like many towns across the country. During a Friday sermon a few weeks after the first protests in Dara’a and Damascus, one man, Badr Janin, stood up and shouted "With our souls and our blood, we will sacrifice for you, Baniyas!". His interjection was all that was required to break the town’s sheikh from his government-issued sermon. “Yes... with our souls and our blood, we will sacrifice for you, Baniyas, and Daraa, and all the rebellious regions," the Sheikh finished. A small group of worshippers left the mosque and held the town’s first protest.
The regime’s mukhabarat responded quickly, setting up one checkpoint inside the town and one on the Zara Bridge, preventing any free movement to the city of Talkalakh. An all-too familiar pattern of abuse and raids by security forces played out over the course of 2011, heightening tensions and pushing locals to inevitably turn from peaceful protestors into armed revolutionaries. As in many Sunni communities, many of those arrested were never seen again.
One media activist from Zara has begun documenting the town’s early revolution. According to him, the first skirmish came on October 30, 2011, when a Criminal Security patrol entered Zara intent on carrying out more arrests. Locals gathered in protest, and so the regional director ordered military units to storm the town. At this point, some locals fired back, killing two soldiers. The military commander agreed to withdraw from inside Zara, but the security cordon around the town tightened.
As the revolution became an armed struggle, Zara’s geographic position enabled the town to play a key role in smuggling weapons from Lebanon to opposition groups across Homs. This brought even greater scrutiny and conflict to the town. On December 30, two men from the town were killed while smuggling weapons near the al-Hawash University. The refused to hand over their bodies until their families signed a paper saying they had been killed by “armed gangs”. When the bodies arrived, they were mutilated: security forces had gouged out the mens’ eyes.
A month later, five more men were executed by security forces at a checkpoint near the al-Ja'fariyyat Bridge. The continual skirmishes and detentions and the regime’s escalating violence across the country pushed the people of Zara into an even more confrontational stance, understanding that they would not survive if they remained isolated and only reacting to regime abuses:
“These events were not merely isolated confrontations; they represented a fateful turning point that pushed al-Zara to an irreversible choice. Carrying arms was no longer merely a defensive option; it had become a necessity for survival in the face of the regime's escalating security campaigns.
Al-Zara became a front in itself, a strategic target that the regime sought to stifle by any means possible. This trajectory culminated in the Great Battle of al-Zara in 2014, where its people proved their resilience despite the siege and fire. What began as a perilous adventure in those first nights later became a heroic epic told through generations, even after the town was stormed and destroyed.”
The Zara Massacre
The revolutionaries in Talkalakh would soon find themselves besieged by regime military and allied militia forces. Homs governorate more broadly was one of the first and fiercest incubators of the pro-regime shabiha movement, crystalizing by early 2012 into the National Defense Forces. The Talkalakh region was a major source of recruitment for this force. The Zara Bridge became the frontline for the town, the fighters inside unable to break through and connect to the Sunnis in the city of Talkalakh. On July 12, 2013, this bridge would become the site of a massacre that began with a brutal siege.
Siege and starvation was a widespread and institutional tactic used by the regime since the beginning of all-out war. Once besieged communities were cut-off from outside help, senior regime officers or political officials would begin negotiating with local notables. This system of siege→starve→reconcile would become the key means by which the regime, and later Russia, would recapture most of the country.
In Zara, as would happen a few months later in the nearby Turkmen village of Mitras, the regime used the siege to force the town into so-called “reconciliation” negotiations. The Zara Facebook page shared a long account of their town’s attempts at reconciliation and the regime’s betrayal that day:
“In those difficult days, the town's notables, those good, pure men, did not hesitate to strive to save what could be saved. They met and decided to knock on the doors of reconciliation, out of concern for the blood of innocents. They began arduous negotiations with the regime forces, carrying an olive branch at a time when the streets were filled with the smell of gunpowder and death.
After days of negotiations, an agreement was reached stipulating the dismantling of the The siege of the town in exchange for handing over eleven young men from its sons to reach a settlement with the regime... a difficult decision... but it was the only way to save thousands of lives trapped by hunger and fear.
On July 12 of that year, the reconciliation convoy set off. Two civilian cars advanced... and a van behind them carrying young men who had taken it upon themselves to sacrifice their safety for their families. The convoy set off, a faint hope on the faces of its men... perhaps reason would overcome madness... and perhaps peace would precede the bullets...
But treachery awaited... at the Zara Bridge... In a scene that will never be erased from memory... the regime's National Defense Forces set up a sinful ambush... led by Fahim Qamuhi from the village of Hajar al-Abyad and Ali Younis from the village of Qumiri... They rained down on the convoy with a hail of bullets and RPGs... paying no attention to the agreement... nor to the sanity of those who came with their hands extended in peace...
It burned The two front cars, including their occupants, were killed, and the pure bodies were turned into shreds. The van, however, managed to escape, leaving the remaining men crawling under the cover of darkness, across fields and valleys, dragging behind them an unhealed pain and the memory of a massacre that will remain a stain of shame on the foreheads of all who colluded and remained silent. On that bloody day, seven of the finest men of Al-Zara were martyred, martyrs whose virtues cannot be described in words. Men who were true to their covenant with God, and who were icons of peace and loyalty. They carried no weapons and did not seek authority. Rather, they went out carrying the banner of reconciliation, believing that shedding blood is more important than adhering to positions, and that a human being is more precious than any false victory. The convoy of martyrs included seven of the finest sons of Al-Zara:
Sheikh Saeed Awad
Professor Hassan Kanaan
Professor Mohammed Kanaan
Colonel Retired Marwan Awad
Retired Colonel Nabil Halawik
Professor Mahmoud Halawik
Professor Ziad Damarji
They fell as martyrs to treachery... for no crime they committed... but rather because they believed the promises of a regime known throughout its history for treachery, betrayal, and ingratitude for every hand extended for peace. They left with goodness in their hearts, pure intentions, and the hope that their families would live in dignity.
As for those who survived the ambush... they returned to Zara carrying an unforgettable story... and the stories of men who chose martyrdom over sacrificing the dignity of their town... men whose names history will forever write in gold and tears...
What happened at the Zara Bridge is living testimony to the criminality of a regime that does not abide by its covenant... and does not hesitate to kill innocents... testimony that this regime fears only the truthful word... and only fights those with good intentions... and that pure blood will remain... the blood of men Reconciliation... a beacon illuminating the path of the free... and a cry in the face of every tyrant... that peace has men... and even if time betrays them... history will do them justice... and from their blood the earth will grow an immortal dignity.”
The Zara Bridge massacre was not the first nor the last time the regime executed those it pledged would be safe. Three months later, regime army and local Alawite militia forces would conduct a similar operation against the small village of Mitras, in Tartous, after which the commanding officer demanded the remaining defectors and fighters to “reconcile”. All would be executed or tortured to death in Sednaya.
Regime forces increased their pressure on the Zara following the massacre. Seven months later, they army and allied militias launched a new battle to capture the town once and for all. On March 8, 2014, the town fell.
Systemic Destruction by Neighbors
Most of the forces used in these battles came from local Alawite men who had volunteered in the pro-regime National Defense Forces. This nation-spanning militia played a critical role in supporting the overstretched army with manpower and manning checkpoints around isolated opposition communities. In Homs governorate, the NDF played a particularly central role in brutal fighting in 2012 and 2013. Beyond fighting, the NDF was an economic powerhouse deeply involved in extortion, kidnapping, and looting. It also operated detention facilities across the country (the investigative outlet Zaman al-Wasl has recently published the pictures of more than 200 men and children who were held in NDF prisons).
With Zara’s capture, these militiamen and army officers were free to steal and destroy everything. From 2014 through 2024, the buildings and farmland were systematically dismantled or taken over by people from the surrounding Alawite communities. The latter crimes are just as impactful as those committed by the security forces before 2014. Often, victims view the years looting and destruction of agricultural land as linked to a wider range of perpetrators, holding the farmers and businessmen of nearby Alawite communities - from which the NDF fighters came from - culpable as well.
With Zara’s residents now returning for their first agricultural season after Assad, the impact of these crimes is particularly glaring. Zara’s media activists recently published a detailed list of crimes, explicitly linking them to the need for a clear framework of transitional justice:
“Since the regime took control of the town of Zara in March 2014, the town's notables have attempted to obtain security approvals for the return of residents. However, the regime's response was that the neighboring villages "did not want them to return," especially the shabiha known as “Ghawar Khanat”, who had not yet completed the theft of property.
During the years (2014 to 2019):
All the contents of homes were looted.
More than 70% of the roofs of buildings were destroyed to extract iron.
More than 600,000 fruit trees were uprooted.
Thousands of beehives, two modern olive presses, wheat mills, and a bread oven were stolen.
Approximately 80 groundwater wells were filled in after their pumps were looted.
More than 100 agricultural tractors were stolen.
130 poultry farms were destroyed.
More than 1,700 greenhouses were stolen.
A number of residents were forced to sell their lands at low prices or forcibly relinquish them. The boundary stones separating the lands were also stolen in an attempt to obscure the features of real estate ownership.
Cow and sheep herders from neighboring Alawite villages have been raiding al-Zara's homes and fields for several years, converting the carpet factory and one of the town's mosques into animal pens, and carrying out widespread vandalism against civilian homes.
Between the years (2019 to 2024):
After a partial return of residents in 2019, thugs from the villages of Qumri, Shloh, and Kafrish started annual fires at the beginning of each summer, burning hundreds of hectares of wheat land and olive trees that were regrowing. These fires were documented in photographs and testimonies from farmers. The fires also caused hundreds of snakes and wild animals to flee toward residential neighborhoods, posing a danger to residents.
In the al-Qasibiyat area, farmers affiliated with the so-called "Ghawar Khanat" from the villages of Khirbet al-Jibab and al-Sindyaneh seized lands owned by the people of al-Zara and prevented the owners from entering or cultivating them.
Shabiha from the village of Hajar al-Abyad seized land belonging to the Khalil family, building a factory, warehouses, and a football field near the Zara Bridge.”
The scale of the regime’s physical destruction of opposition communities is so great that it is easily captured in satellite imagery.
Civil Peace Requires Local Accountability
The specific history of Zara is unique to this town, but the criminal pattern is ubiquitous across the country. Every week a new mass grave is found in a Sunni town which was displaced by the regime, whose surviving population returns now to rebuild their lives. Each of these communities holds the scars and trauma of the crimes - often committed by their neighbors who joined regime militias. With many of the guilty shabiha fleeing the country on December 8, the rest in hiding, and no clear policy from the government on amnesty or accountability, some Sunnis have sought “justice” through indiscriminate revenge against innocent Alawites.
In Zara, there is a clear history of sectarian tensions in the area, exacerbated by the crimes of the Assad regime and local militia fighters during the war, that have gone unaddressed in the half-year since liberation. Such is the case in hundreds of Sunni communities across the country. While some activists make demands for inter-faith dialogue, many ignore the reality on the ground: Sunni communities are often casting a wide net for justice and accountability demands, while Alawite communities have largely remained adamantly opposed to acknowledging the sectarian nature of the Assad regime and their role in his survival. In many cases, neither “side” is in any place to hear the nuances of the others’ experiences - and each sectarian killing since December 8 has only widened the gap between these communities.
Syria risks falling into a vicious cycle of division driven by those irreconcilables on the far extremes of each community. These narratives of revenge and communal retribution feed off of the specific, individual experiences of trauma and crimes endured by millions of Syrians. They continue to thrive in an environment where historical revisionism and sectarian mis-conceptions have gone unaddressed.
Memorializing the martyrs and publicizing the crimes against these communities is a necessary first step in establishing a definitive historical record of what the Assad regime did to those who opposed it. At the same time, Sunni communities need to understand that the Alawite experience under Assad was not universal, and while the regime was powered by Alawite militias and officers, that does not mean the entire sect is guilty for the crimes of those participants.
Justice cannot be achieved through individual acts of personal revenge, particularly when that violence is directed without evidence. Yet the government’s current focus on regime officers with only the most widespread crimes has left many communities afraid that their suffering will never be acknowledged. Building real, effective transitional justice systems at the local level takes time, even under the best circumstances.
In the meantime, the government must focus its efforts on preventing sectarian violence. When an attack by a criminal group can trigger the massacre of an Alawite family, it means the government has failed to both provide real security to Alawite areas and to address the pain and rights of opposition communities. Each failure to do either of these results in more dead Syrians, more sectarian division, and more fear and social stagnation.