Are Damascus' New Security Reforms a form of Federalism?

The historical precedent for the rumored reorganization and what it could mean in practice

Syria 24 published a new report on May 16 that claimed to reveal major upcoming security sector reforms within Syria’s Ministry of Interior. At its root, the multi-step process will see the country divided into five regions within which new security structures will be built, all reporting back to Damascus. Some Syrians, particularly minorities who have been demanding federalism more broadly, have shared this news as the beginning of “security federalism”. But would these reforms actually decentralize or localize security structures? Not likely. Rather, this appears to be both a return to the administrative security structure used for decades under the Assad regime, and a means by which to centralize chain of command at the regional level. Together, these proposed changes may fix some of the serious issues plaguing Syria’s security sector.

All the details provided by Syria 24 should be caveated as reportedly coming from a “source” within the Ministry of Interior: “A private source in the Syrian Ministry of Interior revealed to Syria 24 that the ministry has begun working on adopting a new organizational structure aimed at reorganizing and modernizing the security and police apparatus to meet field and administrative challenges.” However, I heard some of the claims in this report myself while meeting local officials earlier this month.

The report explains that five security regions will be established in order to “serve organizational purposes aimed at facilitating the management of security operations on the ground”, the unification of Ministry of Interior policing units and bringing them under both the Interior and Defense Ministries, and the creation of several new departments aimed at addressing insurgent activity.

First, the establishment of five security regions should not be seen as a ‘decentralizing’ approach to security. Under the Assad regime, military and security structures were likewise divided under the exact same five regions:

• Northern (Aleppo and Idlib)

• Coast (Tartous and Latakia)

• Eastern (Raqqa, Deir Ez Zor and Hasakah)

• Central (Hama and Homs)

• Southern (Damascus and Reef Damascus, Dara’a, and Suwayda)

Each of these regions had a military commander as well as region and sub-regional Security and Military Committees whose directors, theoretically, oversaw all military, police, intelligence, and auxiliary units within that region. This approach was designed, on paper at least, to smooth command and control over the hundreds of different units operating in close proximity of each other.

Interior vs Defense

Bringing back these security regions could likewise enhance the chain of command for the various new security forces operating across Syria. As it currently stands, security in Syria is conducted on two tracks: 1) the Ministry of Interior’s Police and General Security units which report directly to Regional Directors and security officials at the regional and governorate level, 2) military factions, theoretically under the command of the Ministry of Defense, which include core HTS units, close HTS allies, Turkish-backed SNA units, and newly formed MoD divisions. These military units have a much more complex chain of command and varied relationship with the new Ministry of Defense. Making matters worse, one small geographic area might have ten checkpoints each manned by a few dozen men from multiple units. These combined forces theoretically report to a regional military official - if there is one.

However, I have heard consistent reports from the ground that, in reality, the Regional Directors and security officials (both under the Ministry of Interior) are regularly left to reign in misbehaving military units themselves. Of course, being from a different ministry entirely and representing what is essentially just well-armed police units, they have little to no authority, legal or otherwise, over these factions. This dynamic has been a major factor for the slow speed of progress in ending violations in Alawite regions of the coast.

It is important to understand that the Ministry of Interior has largely built its administrative structure around geography. Regional Directors coordinate with local police stations and serve as the intermediaries between civilians and civil government and the local security forces. They are the nodes between the administrative, security, and civil state at the local level. This ministry, while suffering from the same manpower and resource shortages as everyone, is robust and clearly has a more mature bureaucratic structure than the Ministry of Defense. Most of the regional directors have some form of history in Idlib, whether within HTS, the Salvation Government, or the SSG’s Police Academy, and there is therefore a depth of experience, professionalism, and buy-in here that is absent in much of the Ministry of Defense.

The MoD, on the other hand, is now coordinating both traditional army units and operations while also managing an ever-changing landscape of checkpoints across the country. The checkpoints appear to be the main source of friction between MoI and MoD units, as these essentially act as independent, semi-permanent security apparatuses inside the geographic areas of responsibility for MoI Regional Directors.

This proposed plan by the Ministry of Interior may be an attempt at solving this issue. Adding a new layer of MoI officials directly below Damascus enhances the authority of MoI units everywhere. Combining Police and General Security will streamline internal MoI administrative structures and boost both undermanned agencies. Meanwhile, the proposal to make these units a “joint entity between the Ministries of Interior and Defense” that would still “remain under the full oversight of the Ministry of Interior” may mean that Regional Directors and General Security officials will now have legal authority over military factions manning checkpoints in their areas. The proposal to merge the Military Police (formed in early March but seemingly quite small) within this structure would further increase MoI authority over local MoD units.

A New Counter-Insurgent Approach?

The report goes on to provide details of new units that will be formed specifically to target ex-regime insurgents, largely in coastal areas. This conflict is one of, if not the most, sensitive in Syria, with March 6’s coordinated insurgent attack against government forces and the subsequent massacres of Alawites as a prime example of what can happen when it is poorly managed. Currently, counter-insurgent activity is being conducted by both MoD and MoI units. The new proposal appears to be an attempt to do away with this, centralizing operations under two specific departments: “new departments were established, including the Department for the Pursuit of Outlaws… The Ministry of Interior cooperated with the Ministry of Defense to pursue remnants of the former regime and undisciplined groups. The Rapid Intervention Forces Department was also created…tasked with carrying out special operations and responding immediately to incidents.” It remains to be seen how this would work in practice and where the ministries will find the manpower and resources to staff enough of these new units to cover all areas.

Addressing the Manpower Issue

This issue of human resources has plagued every ministry in the new government since December 8. One obvious solution for the security sector has been the recruitment of defected officers, vetted ex-regime members, and locals. The report claims the first of these is now underway, “the ministry has also begun communicating with a number of officers and personnel who defected in the past to reinstate them in their respective roles within the police, security, traffic, and other sectors, in an effort to leverage their expertise and fill the human resource gap.”

Evidence of this specific plan first emerged in early April, when the MoD announced that it had begun interviewing defected officers and NCOs for new positions. Since then, there have been several public announcements of senior defected officers being reinstated to sensitive positions, particularly in the Air and Air Defense Forces where their technical knowledge is highly valuable. However, it appears that some have begun to be hired into senior police positions this month as well, with a defected brigadier general appointed to the Damascus Police Command on May 12, for example.

Where there has been little to no visible progress is in the recruitment of non-Sunni locals into local police and General Security forces. To be sure, there are several regions where minorities serve in armed volunteer roles - particularly in Ismaili communities although also in some Christian and Alawite areas. Yet despite months of discussions around the topic, none of these volunteer formations have been formally integrated into the police command yet. Local officials claim the delay is due to a lack of salaries and available trainers, but some locals have begun to question whether they will ever be allowed in.

While the security reforms detailed in the Syria 24 report do not represent any form of “security federalism”, this centralization of authority under the MoI does not have to preclude a localized security approach. By this point, Regional Directors and security officials have built good lines of communication with the communities they oversee. It should not be difficult for them to identify trusted local interlocutors who can help build local police forces that reflect the sects and cultures of these areas while still operating under the authority of Damascus and the Ministry of Interior. This is not about creating new independent armed groups, but rather easing the critical manpower issue by expanding local recruitment in a way that also enhances trust building and strengthens security and intelligence gathering networks in sensitive areas.

The proposed reforms, if followed, may resolve many of the structural problems impacting the security sector across the country. But there are a few additional steps that should be added. Such a comprehensive approach to security will have huge positive impacts on civil peace while also taking a major first step towards tying minority regions to Damascus, ensuring that all Syrians feel they are a part of Syria’s future.