The Sheikh Maqsoud operation was the STG’s third and by far its most limited military operation, largely relying on a few brigades from three divisions with units of two additional divisions playing an auxiliary role.

The northeast operation was the opposite, by the far the biggest and most complex military operation the STG has undertaken so far. The operation used units from nearly every single division in the army, most of which deployed multiple brigades across different frontlines. This short focuses on the military deployments of this two week battle, tracing where each division was present based on public self-reporting as well as the combat losses suffered by the STG. This is not a day-by-day timeline of the advances.

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Combat Losses

The STG lost at least 128 soldiers during the two weeks of fighting, with nearly all of those deaths occurring in the first five days. There were noticeable jumps in STG-reported deaths on both January 21 and January 26 amid continued advances by STG forces into Arab areas and SDF drone strikes and ambushes.

As with the Sheikh Maqsoud battle, most of the killed soldiers were from Aleppo and Idlib. However, reflecting the wider breadth of units involved in this operation, there were also significantly more deaths among men from Damascus and eastern Syria.

Unlike the Sheikh Maqsoud battle, the northeast battles have seen several senior STG officers killed or wounded. Mine clearance operations killed the commander of the 66th Division’s Engineering Regiment (أبو عمر حطلة) on January 19 and the chief of staff of the 76th Division’s Engineering Regiment (محمود خالد الأخن) on January 21. The commander of the 42nd Division’s Engineering Regiment (أبو مصعب شنان) was killed while clearing SDF tunnels in the Lafarge Plant on January 26.

The 82nd Division, consisting of the former Ansar Tawheed faction, lost three senior officers in an ambush during the initial push to Maskanah on January 17. This included the division’s Operations Commander (ابراهيم محمود زهرة ابو موسى) and the commander (ابو عبد الرحمن كفرعويد) and chief of staff (طه بسام منى) of the Infantry Brigade. The commander of a Commando Brigade (محمد خالد عز الدين حسين النعيمي) from an unknown division was killed on January 22 south of Kobani.

On January 17 a “military commander” in the 42nd Division (أبو عادل السلطاني) was killed during the battle for Tabqa. He had previously led the opposition Liwa al-Izza faction. On January 18 the commander of an unspecified unit in the 66th Division (جمعة جاسم الزين ابو بهاء) was killed and a battalion commander in the 52nd Division was wounded in the Euphrates river area.

The losses suffered by the STG paint a more nuanced picture to the collapse of the SDF during the first week of fighting. SDF units did not withdraw from their positions west of the Euphrates, putting up a substantial fight in Tabqa and Mansoura in particular. Instead, it seems to have been the defection of the Arab component of the SDF combined with the massive, coordinated military force brought to bear by the STG and the local Arab uprisings within SDF territory that combined to collapse the SDF’s military position.

Government Unit Deployment

The following section contains a map showing each division’s movement across the northeast beginning on January 17 followed by a write-up of each division’s known movements and the specific sub-units involved. All of this information is based on social media posts by unit members and community Facebook pages, often relying on matching pictured commanders to previously documented unit assignments.

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A separate article this week will examine the conduct of the STG’s military forces during the battle and how the loss of Aleppo city changes the SDF’s position when negotiating their integration into the new government. Here, I will look at the government soldiers killed between January 6 and January 10, including their backgrounds and what units they fought in. Long-time readers will be familiar with these types of reports; for those newer readers, these ‘martyrdom announcements’ are shared on Facebook pages belonging to soldiers’ friends, families, and hometowns. They are used to honor the sacrifices of fighters and are ubiquitous across all sides of the Syrian war.

The information provided here comes only from pro-STG accounts, rather than pro-SDF accounts which might publish fake lists of STG dead. Yet they represent a base minimum of losses given the difficulty in searching for and finding every martyrdom announcement. I will update this post if the STG ends up releasing any official statistics.

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The Martyrs

At least 39 soldiers were killed during the five day battle. Of these, more than half of the reports (24) were published on January 9 and 10. This likely reflects the STG’s advance into Ashrafiyah beginning late on January 8 into the early morning of January 9, and their advance into Sheikh Maqsoud late on January 9 into the morning of January 10.

Of these men, 18 are from Aleppo (46%), 9 are from Idlib (23%), 4 are from Homs (10%) and Hama (10%) each, and 2 (5%) are from rural Damascus. The home governorates of two soldiers are not clear.

The high number of men from Aleppo among the dead reflects the STG’s broader approach to is military and security institutions. Generally speaking, the new government has pursued a policy of having men serve in divisions that are based within their home governorate. The main two divisions leading this operation are Aleppo-based units, meaning most of their fighters are from Aleppo. However, several former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) brigades (which have a more varied recruit background) played key roles as assault forces, resulting in the Idlib, Hama, and Homs deaths.

Most of the killed soldiers appear to be veteran fighters, whether from HTS or from the Syrian National Army. Only one martyr, Amer Zabdiya, from Aleppo, was clearly identified as a post-liberation recruit, having “returned from Turkey several months ago.” Yet many martyrs were part of the second generation of opposition fighters, such as Bilal Najihi, from southern Aleppo, who first joined the armed opposition in 2022 when he turned 18, following in his father’s footsteps who had taken up arms in 2011.

Their Units

The first two government martyrs were killed on January 6 during the initial SDF drone attacks on government positions in the early afternoon. The first was a soldier in the 72nd Division, followed later by a military trainer in the 60th Division. These two divisions would represent the bulk of combat losses over the next five days, with 18 of 26 men with identified units belonging to them.

On January 7, three more soldiers were reported killed on the “Sheikh Maqsoud front” as negotiations broke down and Damascus began to mobilize its forces for a wider battle. Two were from the 72nd Division while the third, killed in the early morning hours of January 7, was from the 60th Division’s 2nd Brigade. The 2nd Brigade, also known as the “Elite Forces,” is likely built around a former HTS brigade.

This same day the first images of senior MoD command emerged, beginning with a picture of the commander of the 60th Division monitoring SDF positions via drones. 72nd Division units deployed with heavy weapons along the front, using recoilless rifles along with artillery and mortars. Damascus also began evacuating civilians from SDF-held neighborhoods on this day.

Members of the 72nd Division firing a 106mm recoilless rifle at SDF positions.

Reported deaths began to rise significantly on January 8 as clashes intensified. Ten soldiers were reported killed throughout the day, four from the 60th Division and six from unspecified units. The intensification of operations coincided with the arrival of the Ministry of Defense’s Chief of Staff, Major General Ali al-Naasan, and the formation of an operations room consisting of the commanders of the 60th, 72nd, and 98th Armored Divisions (all led by veteran HTS officers). That night, STG units entered and secured the Ashrafiyah neighborhood.

The deaths of nine more soldiers were reported throughout January 9 as STG forces finished securing Ashrafiyah and Beni Zeid neighborhoods and closed in on Sheikh Maqsoud. As with the previous day, most deaths were from the 60th Division, including a unit commander, Mohammad al-Omar. This division was, according to one General Security source in Aleppo, the sole unit tasked with assaulting SDF positions, with other divisions providing fire support and helping with combing operations.

Among the dead on January 9 was a formerly displaced fighter from West Ghouta serving as a tank operator in the 76th Division (the former Hamzat Division). This was the first evidence of the involvement of the 76th, which seems to have deployed some armored and infantry units to support operations that day.

Fourteen more soldiers were reported killed throughout January 10 as the STG forces entered Sheikh Maqsoud. It is likely that many of these men were killed during the fighting in the neighborhood during the evening of January 9 and pre-dawn hours of January 10. Among them were two each from the 60th and 72nd Divisions, another soldier from rural Damascus serving in the 76th Division, and a soldier from the 98th Armored Division’s 87th Brigade, likely serving in an armored vehicle.

However, sometime on January 9 units of the 52nd Special Forces Division had arrived from Homs, likely in anticipation of the upcoming assault on Sheikh Maqsoud. The division’s “Elite Brigade”, also built around a former HTS brigade, appears to have taken the lead role in the assault that night, with at least four men from the brigade killed during the final battles.

Lastly, one General Security member was killed in the afternoon by a SDF suicide drone strike on the Aleppo General Security Headquarters.

Throughout the five-day battle, the SDF claimed that the STG had deployed the Amshat, Hamzat, and Zenki forces - all former Syrian National Army factions which have been sanctioned by various western countries for human rights abuses. However, there is no evidence that Amshat (62nd Division) or Zenki (80th Division) were ever deployed in Aleppo city. As stated above, there is evidence that at least one armored unit of the 76th Division, which is built seemingly entirely around the former Hamzat Division, was deployed to the front on January 9. The main units involved, however, appear to be former HTS brigades operating within the 52nd, 60th, and 98th Division, as well as some smaller ex-SNA units in the 72nd Division such as the Sultan Mehmed Fatih Division.

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You can find a full breakdown of each division’s component factions and leadership in my regularly updated report on the new Syrian Army:

The following is one such account, a second excerpt from the 2021 biography of the (still living) Republican Guard general Kamal Atiyeh written and published online by a pro-regime source. Part one focused on his role leading the 104^th Brigade’s 3rd Battalion in suppressing demonstrations in Douma in spring 2011 until the first major military operations against the armed opposition in East Ghouta in late January 2012. Part two of the biography looks at the rest of 2012, as his battalion is sent across Damascus and Homs to help in military operations targeting civilians and armed groups alike. The first half of this report will simply transcribe these events exactly as they were written in the original post. The second half will take a deeper look at each of these battles, the other units involved, documented regime casualties, and the impacts of the operations.

“2012

- The first month: The terrorists in Wadi Barada took control of some of the valley's villages and threatened to cut off water to Damascus and poison the water. A force was heading towards the valley and the terrorists in the village of Ashrafieh al-Wadi and Basima set up an ambush for the army. This ambush led to the martyrdom of General Rajih Mahmoud, head of the engineering branch in the Guard Command. [killed February 1, 2012]

General Kamal was assigned with a group of his colleagues to move on the axis of Jdeidet al-Wadi - Ashrafieh - Basima. He moved with a group from Deir Qanoun - Kafr al-Zeit - al-Fijah. He was supported in this campaign by heavy and medium equipment.

- The second month: The situation in Homs worsened, especially Bab Omar, where the Farouq Brigades, led by a defected Lieutenant, announced control over some of Homs' neighborhoods, and kidnapping, killing and rape increased.

- The sixth month: General Kamal joined the forces in Homs after the army had taken control of Sultanieh and Bab Omar neighborhoods and some other neighborhoods. Upon his arrival with the battalion, the forces were fighting in Bab Hood, Jouret al-Shiyyam, al-Qarabis, al-Qusour and al-Khalidiya.

Upon his arrival in Homs, the battles were at their fiercest in Jouret al-Shiyyah, al-Khalidiya, al-Qarabis and al-Qusour.

General Issam and those with him took the Armored Corps College and the Officers Club as their headquarters, and he was determined to end the battle of Homs completely because the militants had become surrounded from all sides.

- Homs is the only city in which aircraft were not used.

The first battles fought by General Kamal in Jouret al-Shiyyah - al-Qarabis pointing towards al-Amal Hospital - the Bar Association. al-Amal Hospital is a modern building made of reinforced concrete and has two floors underground. It was difficult to control it. The martyred media figure Yara Abbas and the media figure Kinda Khader were documenting the battle, at that time the army suffered heavy losses in the battle.

The ninth month: General Kamal was assigned to go to Homs [take charge of operations] on behalf of General Issam Zahreddine, as he was the oldest officer in the 104th Brigade. On 9/20/2012, General Issam and his group were ordered to go to Deir Ezzor to support the forces. Reason: The fall of the Deir Ezzor countryside into the hands of the terrorists, and only a part of the city, the airport, the 137th Brigade, and the 17th Division remained.

- 9/26, the attack began to retake the city [Deir Ez Zor], and several neighborhoods were retaken, such as the Jbeilah neighborhood, the Muwazafin and Al-Ummal neighborhoods, and Al-Rusafa.

- On 9/29, General Ali Khazam was shot in the head and was transferred to the hospital and martyred on 10/6. At that time, General Kamal and his colleagues were fighting fierce battles against the terrorists in all the neighborhoods of Homs.

- The eleventh month: Douma fell into the hands of the militants.

At that time, the guard forces were withdrawn from Homs to carry out a new operation and retake Douma and the line from Ghubeir Square in Arbin to the Vehicle Administration Square, and encircling Marj al-Sultan Airport.

General Kamal was assigned to carry out the mission and break the siege, but the mission was not carried out due to the pressure on Mezzeh Airport from the direction of Darayya.

The militants were unable to enter Damascus from the direction of Jobar - Abbasid Square, so they decided to enter Damascus’ Umayyad Square from the direction of Darayya - Mezzeh.

The mission was changed for the Guard and the Fourth Division to attack Darayya: from the east, the Republican Guard, and the west, the Fourth Division.

The Guard attacked from the Daraa Road, next to Town Center, towards Darayya, and the army fought fierce battles until it reached the Khawlani Mosque, Sayyida Sakina Restaurant, and the Iron Road.

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By The Numbers

Syrian army combat losses – reported by the regime online and collected by this author over the years – provide a quantitative insight into the battles outlines in the above narrative. An examination of the specific battles Kamal Atiyeh participated in as well as the context in which they occurred follows, including extensive combat casualty data from this author’s own database.

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Many regime units from the Aleppo city front seem to have retreated to Safira over the previous days, and the opposition’s rapid advance today resulted large regime convoys quickly retreating south. Opposition units ambushed one of these convoys killing dozens of soldiers, while another ambushed convoy resulted in scores of POWs. Despite the opposition’s advances in the Safira countryside today, it appears that some regime fighters are still holed up in part of the Defense Factories, with reports today that the regime conducted airstrikes in support of the besieged forces. However, at least part of the Defense Factories are under opposition control.

On the southern front, Fatah Mubin (FM) units worked to secure their gains in southern Idlib and northern Hama from the day before, while regime forces slowly advanced north from Hama city. Early in the morning of December 1, Fatah Mubin announced the complete liberation of Idlib governorate. All eyes now turned to northern Hama, which appears to have effectively become no-man’s land by the afternoon and evening of November 30. The rapid opposition advance that day seems to have been led by a unit of Fatah Mubin’s ‘Liwa Talha bin Ubeid Allah’ which had long been stationed in the adjacent Jabal Zawiyah region. This unit seems to have taken the initiative to pursue withdrawing regime forces, resulting in the more haphazard advance through the countryside and confusion over which towns had been liberated (a military commander of the unit was killed during this advance near the Hama border). Skirmishes broke out that night in the chaos, with local regime militias pushing opposition fighters back along a line from Qalaat al-Mudiq to Kernaz to Halfaya. Several opposition fighters were captured as they approached Qalaat al-Mudiq thinking it was under their control.

In the morning, pro-regime militias began to advance north from Qomhana, securing Taybat al-Imam as their main forward operating base and from there spreading out to Souran and the string of villages leading to the city of Lataminah. However, at the same time more elite Fatah Mubin units had arrived, brining with them the drones that have come to define this offensive. Heavy fighting broke out in Morek as both sides advanced on the town, but by mid-afternoon the regime had withdrawn and set up positions just north of Souran. Meanwhile, opposition drone operators began harassing regime units, striking gatherings in Taybat al-Imam as well as striking jets in Hama Airport. Among these attacks was an FPV drone strike on the car of Hama’s Military Intelligence chief, Brigadier Uday Ghossa, making him the second Military Intelligence branch director killed in the offensive.

Frontlines solidify (for now)

The frontlines may be starting to solidify now. In the east, regime forces appear to have withdrawn entirely from Khanasir to Ithriya, effectively leaving southeast Aleppo empty. However, this is sparse, mostly desert terrain and while the opposition may official take control of more parts of it, there is little strategic use of the space until Ithriya.

In Hama, clashes have been focused on three fronts. Opposition forces in Kafr Zita have been attempting to advance south on Lataminah, who’s status is unclear but appears contested (a local pro-regime civilian posted a rough map of control in the evening which showed the city controlled by neither side). With Morek secure, the opposition is now pushing south along the eastern axis, first liberating Ma’an and then Kawkab which puts them just two miles east of Souran. Opposition forces also advanced east of here without much apparent resistance. However, at night regime forces posted videos of them entering the village of Samra, east of Kawkab, claiming that the opposition had withdrawn. To the north, opposition units spent the day clearing the villages of Jabal Shashbo. Securing this mountain range is key for any future attack on Qalaat al-Mudiq and moving in the Sahel al-Ghab.

Regime tries to rebuild its forces

With these lines now established the regime continues to send units north. The Syrian Army’s Chief of Staff, Lt General Abdul Karim Ibrahim was filmed meeting commanders in Qomhana, the first sign of senior army leadership’s direct involvement since the offensive began. Videos throughout the day showed heavy armor of the 4th Division’s 42nd Brigade (also known as the Ghaith Forces) deploy north of Hama city and launching heavy rockets from their indigenous “Golan” launchers at opposition positions. Regime-affiliated media also broadcast a video from the top of Jabal Zain al-Abidin - the strategic mountain base just north of Hama city - showing army vehicles arriving and the launch of Grad rockets on the towns below.

While the army attempts to reorganize, Alawite militias continue to mobilize. In the Alawite town of Rabia - famous for the number of regime ‘martyrs’ it has sacrificed - announcements were made for new “volunteer contracts” with two regime-affiliated militias in the town that promised “very high pay". Pro-regime Facebook pages have also boasted of “thousands” of men from coastal regions flocking to join the National Defense Forces, a major pro-regime militia network, over the past two days. While one former NDF member told the author that this was largely propaganda, pictures have emerged from some NDF centers showing groups of either new recruits or non-active duty members gathering.

The opposition now finds itself in an eerily reminiscent position as during the infamous annual Hama spring offensives of the past, when opposition coalitions repeatedly tried to break through to Hama city but were stopped short by this same wall of villages. Now, however, the opposition has massive momentum and is much better armed and organized. As long as the regime or Russian air forces to do begin to seriously strike this frontline, opposition units should be able to hold their positions and slowly attrite regime forces with their drones. With the regime pushed back all the way to Ithriya in the east, Fatah Mubin may try to advance in a wide eastward flank as well, avoiding the small wall of mountains north of Hama that have long protected the city. Other options include simply holding the line here and opening a new front on the Sahel al-Ghab and Latakia, threatening the heart of regime control once and for all. Regardless, it seems likely that the battle will slow now.

Meanwhile, opposition forces have secured Aleppo city and a massive swathe of cities that have been decimate by years of regime attacks and systemic looting. With the frontlines pushed so far south, the local governments in northwest Syria will be able to begin the long process of reconstruction and re-housing hundreds of thousands of displaced people currently living in tents.

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Further south, opposition forces continued their steady advance east of Saraqib, quickly seizing Abu Dhuhur Airbase and then turning south to clear the rest of southeast Idlib. These areas appeared to fall without much resistance, a trend that would continue throughout the day. From Khan Sabeel and Jabal Zawiyah, other opposition units began a speedy advance south through southern Idlib and into northern Hama. Claims of territorial changes here were chaotic throughout the day, as city after city appeared to be abandoned by the regime. Maarat al-Numan put up minimal fight, with at least one regime soldier reported killed there. Most of the other towns appeared to be abandoned before the opposition arrived.

Regime forces were rapidly pulling their dispersed units south to establish a new defensive line in between Qomhana and Taybat al-Imam that afternoon. There seemed to be more resistance as the opposition approached this line, with regime units less quick to abandon their towns. At least two opposition fighters were killed during the capture of Morek, for example. As evening approached, pro-opposition media was awash with claims that they had not only captured the Christian towns of Suqaylabiyah and Muhradeh, but that the gateway to Hama had falled - Qomhana and Mount Zain al-Abidin. A video was published after sunset showing a cheering convoy of opposition fighter entering the northeast Hama neighborhood of al-Arbaen, and rumors began spreading that the regime had completely abandoned the city. At the same time, videos were published appearing to show locals in Talbiseh and Rastan attacking regime forces stationed in their towns. This apparent new insurgency would mean that the Hama-Homs highway was cut, and with regime forces evacuating Hama, the city had effectively fallen.

However, regime soldiers soon began posting videos of themselves gathering in northern Hama city, and then inside Qomhana, Suqaylabiyah, and Muhradeh. While some opposition fighters had advanced into the edge of Hama city, they had quickly withdrawn when they found security forces still in the city. This part of Hama is the bedrock of one of the largest pro-regime militia networks in Syria, and these local fighters had been organizing inside Hama throughout the afternoon as retreating army units from the north and advancing army units from Damascus converged on the city.

Meanwhile, it increasingly appears that the regime has managed to hold onto four key points on the Aleppo front. Both pro-regime and pro-opposition media has begun hinting at regime forces besieged in the Zahraa Artillery Battalion, Military Engineering Academy, and Artillery College in west Aleppo city (pro-regime users with family and friends in the colleges have been posting about “praying for their safe return” and “the steadfast fortress” as well as well as announcing more than ten soldiers killed in the academy today, while pro-opposition accounts in Aleppo have been warning drivers to be careful when driving near these locations because they remain under enemy control). Claims have also been made that while the city of Safira has been liberated, the infamous Safira Defense Factories - where Assad and his Iranian allies produce their chemical weapons and large missiles - remains in regime hands. This heavily fortified compound provides the regime with a powerful potential foothold from which to cut the opposition’s eastern Aleppo salient, while the besieged pockets in west Aleppo will stress opposition manpower that may sorely be needed in the south.

Why the collapse?

Four days into this unprecedented event, we can begin to explore why the regime’s security forces initially collapsed. Previous editions of this coverage have already discussed the absence of the Russian Air Force and how the practice of tafyish meant regime positions were chronically undermanned. However there are additional factors that may have contributed to the collapse in the chain of command. Since 2018, Russian officers in Syria have attempted to reform the way in which senior Syrian officers operate on the battlefield. Long-time watchers of Syria’s war will remember that for most of the war, senior regime commanders were constantly being killed in battles. According to a Syrian officer the author spoke with in 2019, the Russians attempted to mitigate this issue by encouraging regime officers to stop leading from the frontlines and instead operate from far in the rear, where they were safer and theoretically could more easily organize their forces. This change in practice was apparent in the 2018 East Ghouta offensive, and especially during the 2019 northwest offensive, both of which saw a far reduced number of senior regime deaths.

Now, with the launch of this newest opposition offensive, senior commanders who have been ingrained with leading from the rear were not present when their units came under attack and communications lost. These units, unable to contact their battalion or brigade commanders, were then left to make decisions on their own, a practice not common to Syrian military doctrine. This may help explain the complete collapse of command communication (which has been confirmed by several regime fighters), and the resulting case where some units attempted to fight while others simply ran.

Complicating matter further is the growing evidence that regime forces faced at least some desertions during the first three days of the offensive. Posts began emerging as early as November 28 on pro-regime coastal pages celebrating the “safe return” of officers from those towns “from the battles in Aleppo” - a fairly clear sign that the men had simply abandoned their units and returned home. A former pro-regime fighter who traveled through Hama on November 30 confirmed to the author that he both saw and heard from others of additional desertions occurring throughout the day as regime units continued to fall south.

While these factors likely contributed to the widespread collapse of the first days of the offensive, it remains to be seen if they will continue to be a major factor going forward.

Looming regime counter attack

Now a clear defensive line has been established for the first time. Pro-regime media has been rife with claims of counter-attacks throughout the night, claiming to have recaptured several towns north of Qomhana as well as opening a new axis in southeast Idlib via the regime positions in Salamiyah. There is not yet any visual evidence to support these claims. However, unlike the previous three days’ advances, this southern advance appeared to be conducted in a less coordinated manner with fewer opposition units, seeking to exploit a retreating regime more than to move forward carefully. It is unlikely that Fatah Mubin forces have established their own strong defensive lines on this front yet and may very well have pulled out of some forward positions back to the larger cities of Khan Sheikhoun, Lataminah, and Kafr Nabudeh.

Shortly after sunrise, a member of the Qomhana-based Tarmeh regiment filmed himself driving back to Hama city claiming that they had just entered the towns of Maardes, Souran, and Taybat al-Imam and faced no resistance, the towns empty of any opposition. A local pro-regime Facebook page similarly claimed that at 4:00am regime forces had managed to re-secure Halfaya and Qalaat al-Mudiq, while a video emerged around that same time showing local regime militiamen with four captured opposition fighters who were caught “outside Qalaat al-Mudiq while trying to enter the town which they thought had been liberated”.

The next 24-48 hours will be an important test for the opposition. Fatah Mubin will need to be able to shift enough resources south to blunt and potentially turn any regime counter attack while also securing eastern Aleppo from any potential attack from both Safira and the besieged pockets. The “easy” part of the offensive is over, now they must secure their new gains.

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Fatah Mubin (FM) forces made their biggest advances of the offensive on November 29. By mid-day, opposition units had broken through the regime’s defensives lines in the suburbs of western Aleppo, capturing and clearing the Hamadaniyeh and New Aleppo suburbs and reaching the city’s ring road by the evening. The first regime reinforcements that arrived in Aleppo late on the 28th had been deployed to these neighborhoods, and their quick collapse seems to have set the regime forces remaining in the city into chaos. After a brief pause, a slew of videos began to emerge throughout the night showing opposition units spreading across the city, cutting through the old city to the eastern neighborhoods. Finally, in the dark, footage was shared online of fighters waving a Free Syrian Army flag on the steps of Aleppo’s famous citadel. Amid the chaos, it seems that opposition forces managed to kill the head of the regime’s Military Intelligence Aleppo Branch, Brigadier General Ali al-Ali.

As the sun rises on the fourth day of the offensive it is unclear just how much of the city has been liberated. Reports of opposition advances into the northern neighborhoods appear sparse, while it is likely that FM forces will quickly finish securing the southern neighborhoods. To the city’s east sits the Aleppo International Airport and Neyrab, both historically strongholds of regime and Iranian militias and military units. It is possible that the regime forces scattered across the city have attempted to regroup here, or they may have withdrawn even further into the eastern countryside. The city of Safira, some eight miles east of Neyrab, is a major Iranian and Syrian militia hub while the Kweires military base, around 17 miles from Neyrab, has become a hub of Russian and regime military forces in recent years.

Opposition forces also made serious progress south of the city. Advances continued across the M5 from Muhandiseen, with opposition forces quickly seizing Khan Touman and then working south to Hader. From Zerbeh and Kafr Halab, units quickly liberated the strategic el-Eiss and continued south to Abed and Hawer el-Eiss. Resistance here seems weak, at best.

Meanwhile the battle for Saraqib raged on. Regime claims of advancing on this front over the previous evening were false, and in the morning the opposition renewed its attempts to storm the town. Three storming attempts were made from Jawbas before fighters were able to break through and begin clearing the city. An hour before sunset the city was largely captured, with cleanup operations and sporadic skirmishes with remaining regime pockets underway. As the sun set, other opposition units moved south, securing Sheikh Idriss and Khan Sabeel. Resistance here was light, according to one opposition soldier, and five tanks were captured in Khan Sabeel alone.

There were additional unconfirmed but seemingly credible reports that the regime abandoned Tel Touqan and Jazraya in the afternoon, withdrawing east likely to Abu Dhuhur, and that small units of opposition fighters had made their way to the villages in the dark. Whatever the case, the opposition will likely be close to if not at Abu Dhuhur sometime on November 30. It remains to be seen if regime forces have attempted to regroup at the adjacent airbase and create a defensive line, or if they will continue to fall back. There have been additional claims throughout the evening that opposition forces advanced south of Khan Sabeel, liberating some of the villages directly adjacent to Maarat al-Numan. These claims were explicitly denied by a fighter in Khan Sabeel, but will likely become true sometime on November 30 regardless.

The Difficulties of Ruling

North of the opposition’s newly controlled territory sits the Sheikh Maqsoud district, Aleppo’s large Kurdish neighborhood. Opposition factions and Sheikh Maqsoud have a tense relationship dating back to the final months of the 2016 Aleppo battle. The last hours have seen many rumors about whether Sheikh Maqsoud will fight alongside regime forces against the opposition, or if it intends to remain neutral (it has done both in the past). The best course for the opposition may be to leave the district alone while Idlib’s leaders negotiate with the Kurdish leadership of the enclave. Further north of here, along the Anadan front, sits the Shia enclave of Nubl and Zahraa, which have for years been one of the largest centers of Hezbollah and Iranian recruitment and militant activity in the country. The opposition’s rapid advance into Aleppo city now threatens to cut these two towns off from regime territory.

As the opposition entered Aleppo city on November 29, the head of Idlib’s Salvation Government (SSG) Directorate for Minority Affairs’ Department of Political Affairs released two new statements directed towards Aleppo’s religious minorities. The first attempted “…to reassure all minorities, including Christians, that their lives, properties, places of worship and freedoms will be protected.” The second statement was specifically addressed to the Shia enclaves north of Aleppo, stating:

“we emphasize that the people of the localities of Nubl and al-Zahara’, like other Syrian civilians, must not be targeted or threatened in any way on the basis of sect or ethnic affiliation. We also call on the people of Nubl and al-Zahara’, and all the Syrian regions, not to stand alongside the criminal regime and aid it in killing the Syrian people and deepening its humanitarian suffering. Likewise the people there must reject being used as tools for the Iranian project and Hezbollah in the region, lest they pay the price for this.”

The international community will closely watch how Idlib’s leaders deal with the minority enclaves. However, it must be noted that the SSG has spent more than six years engaging with both the Christian and Druze communities in Idlib. An independent, region-wide administrative body was created to serve as a focal point for all communities, including those of minorities. Gradually, this body worked to address complaints and return the homes and farm land that had been seized by a variety of opposition groups in past years. This author has met with some of these community leaders, who told him that, while slow, significant progress has been made for their community in relation to security, property rights, economy, and religious discourse.

Idlib’s leaders will now look to extend that relationship to a new group of minorities - ones with which the opposition has a much more fraught history - as a crucial step in legitimizing the SSG and Idlib governance model as a viable and internationally-sound institution for ruling not just Idlib, but Syria’s second largest city. In order to achieve this, it may be best if Fatah Mubin redirects its forces for now to the east and south, prioritizing securing its gains from any potential regime counter-attack while its leader’s attempt to find a diplomatic solution to integrate these communities.

Returning to 2017 lines?

Both the Turkish and Russian governments released their first statements on the offensive on November 29, providing a glimpse into where the offensive may go. Reuters reported a very brief statement from Moscow that “it wanted the Syrian government to restore constitutional order in the Aleppo region as soon as possible” which seems to all but explicitly admit Russia has no intent of providing any serious air support to the collapsing regime forces. Later, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a long statement in Turkish and English, copied below:

The Turkish statement invokes the 2017 Astana agreement, signed by Turkey, Russia, and Iran, which created four “de-escalation zones” controlled by the Syrian opposition across the country where all sides would cease attacks. The Turkish statement highlights their fulfillment of this agreement while calling out continued violations by Russia and the regime and lending weight to the legitimacy of the current opposition offensive as a corrective measure for these violations.

With this context, it is possible that Ankara is signaling its openness to a more expansive opposition offensive that would see a return to the 2017 de-escalation borders in the northwest. This would more than double the opposition’s current area of control in Idlib, bringing in major cities in southern and eastern Idlib, and also pushing regime forces far enough away that they would no longer be able to regularly shell currently liberated towns in the Zawiyah Mountains.

It is feasible that the opposition will begin pushing into these regions in the coming days, especially if regime forces continue to collapse and the Russian air force continues to be largely absent. If these areas are liberated, Turkey may see this as a positive development and step in to ensure they are not recaptured by the regime, should the regime somehow gain the upper hand.

Helping the Displaced

The current opposition advances and possibility of a widening front to the south now raise the complicated issue of ruling a new large and politically and religiously diverse region. This issue is made even more difficult by the fact that Idlib and its ruling government are still largely cut-off from the international community, despite facing education, economic and housing crises for years due to the massive population of internally displaced Syrians. However, these advances now provide the first opportunity ever for hundreds of thousands of Syrians to leave the sprawling IDP tent camps and return to their homes.

Early on November 28 the Idlib Media Center reported a statement from the Military Operations Department that:

“The areas liberated yesterday during ‘Operation Deterrence of Aggression’ pave the way for the return of more than 100,000 displaced persons to their homes and lands, which contributes to alleviating the humanitarian suffering in northwestern Syria.”

Already municipal workers from the SSG have begun repairing roads and prepping some of these towns in western Aleppo for their populations’ return.

The expansion of liberated areas to now include a growing number of towns in the eastern Idlib countryside opens the door to hundreds of thousands of more residents returning home. This areas - especially the land east of Saraqib - was controlled for many years by the Syrian opposition until a dual ISIS-Syrian regime offensive in 2018 expelled most of the residents. The area south of Saraqib in southern Idlib and northern Hama remains similarly vacant after the regime’s 2019 offensive captured dozens of towns and major cities like Khan Sheikhoun, Kafr Nabl, and Maarat al-Numan. Not only were these residents expelled to tent camps in Idlib, but the regime has spent the past four years using these towns as military positions from which they regularly bomb towns in opposition-controlled Jabal Zawiyah, creating yet another zone of uninhabitable communities.

If opposition forces are able to advance south of Saraqib and re-liberate these areas, it will enable the largest return of displaced persons ever seen in the war. However, regime forces have looted most of these communities down to their walls, stealing everything from appliances, to wiring, to roofs. Reconstruction needs will be immense, but so is the opportunity to alleviate part of the humanitarian suffering in northwest Syria - if the international community can step up and assist local authorities in repairing the newly liberated areas as well as the towns in southern Idlib that have suffered under a decade of bombing.

First, though, Fatah Mubin will have to continue securing their current gains against whatever regime counter-attack may or may not materialize. For now it appears that regime forces remain in disarray, but more units continue to be sent north from across the country. At least one convoy of heavy rocket launchers from the 4th Division’s 42nd Brigade was pictured driving north from Damascus today. Meanwhile Liwa al-Quds - the pro-regime militia that once formed a major part of the regime’s auxiliary forces in Aleppo city - has reportedly begun sending many of its units back to Aleppo from the central desert, where they have been battling an ISIS insurgency for five years.

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Day Two Gains

Most of the fighting on November 28th was focused on the southern axis. Fatah Mubin (FM) forces advanced on Sheikh Aqil and Muhandiseen early in the morning, expanding the frontline south from Regiment 46 and Kafr Naha, respectively. They then closed the small pocket by liberating Kafr Joum, placing FM forces adjacent to the M5 Highway along a nearly 8 mile stretch. Other units continued the push on the northern side of this front over the course of the afternoon, fully liberating Khan Assal, Kafr Dael, and Mansoura and placing them on the doorstep of Aleppo’s western suburbs. One the southern side, opposition units cut the M5 by seizing the town of Zerba, effectively cutting the major regime artery to Aleppo city and placing the remaining regime forces south of Zerba in danger of being stranded. By evening the opposition had cleared Kafr Halab as well.

Fatah Mubin also diverted some units to the Saraqib front over the course of the night / early morning. These units launched a new ground assault in the morning, targeting and eventually seizing Dadikh, Tarnaba, and Kafr Battikh. These forward infantry units were supported by artillery and ATGM units further back which were able to target any regime forces attempting to push south from Saraqib. From here, some FM infantry advanced into the southern neighborhood of Saraqib. Clashes were reported here throughout the day but no clear progress was made by nightfall. According to one opposition fighter on this front, the most difficult part of the initial advance was maneuvering through the hilly terrain on the western side of Dadikh in order to get clear lines of sight on southern Saraqib. Despite the uncertain progress on the city itself, the capture of these three villages gave the opposition fire control over the M5 south of Saraqib, effectively cutting the city from resupply.

Lastly, some progress was made on the Anadan axis, though it seems that the opposition committed minimal resources here this day. Units advanced on and captured the village of Yaqid Adas, placing them less than 1.5 miles from Anadan.

Regime death reports continue to trickle in, and like the first day continue to contain many mid-ranking officers. Two more colonels were reported killed - bringing the total two three - as well as another major and three captains. A senior Iranian general from the IRGC was also reported killed, likely on November 27.

The death of the IRGC general brings up the question of Iranian and Hezbollah presence - or lack thereof - on the west Aleppo axis. This area had been the center of Iranian and Hezbollah direct ground involvement, especially during the regime’s 2019-2020 offensive that resulted in the original capture of these villages. Evidence of their presence this time has been more limited, possibly suggesting that they have pulled back in the past year due to their war with Israel. However, joining the IRGC general were the confirmed deaths of at least 14 militia fighters from the Shia villages of Nubl and Zahraa. These men, among them a unit commander, all appear to have been killed on the 28th in Sheikh Aqil and Muhadiseen in the south, and in Yaqid Adas in the north.

Where are the Russians?

Now two days into the opposition’s first true offensive since 2017, one looming question remains: Where is the Russian Airforce? Russian jets have been the backbone of regime defensive and offensive capabilities ever since Moscow deployed its army to Syria in October 2015. During the regime’s 2019 northwest offensive, Russian jets played a key role in hammering every frontline village held by the opposition until they were uninhabitable. Even during the four-year “ceasefire”, Russia conducted massive bombing campaigns against civilian and military targets across Idlib at least once each year, often for punitive measures in response to small opposition attacks.

Yet Russian jets have barely been present for the past 48 hours. The most intense bombing occurred late in the night on November 27 when jets struck Atareb and near Saraqib. Later on November 28 a Russian jet bombed a home in Atareb, killing 14 civilians. There was also a reported uptick in Russian airstrikes around Saraqib throughout the day in response to the opposition’s initial advances. Nonetheless, as an opposition fighter on the Saraqib front told the author, “the jets are striking, but at a slower pace than all the battles I have fought since the beginning of the revolution.”

The lack of Russian air involvement may hint at one reason for the rapid collapse of regime lines. The Russians have spent years gradually emplacing Syrian units that they support across the Idlib frontline. The regime’s 30th Division - closely backed by Russia - took over the primary defense responsibilities of west Aleppo following the 2020 ceasefire. It is possible that Russian commanders were supposed to play a key role in command and control of these Syrian units in case of any opposition attack, in which case their absence now would have induced a significant amount of chaos through the chain of command.

Regardless, Russian jets have yet to bomb anywhere close to the degree they have in the past, and regime lines have now collapsed to the Aleppo suburbs. The opposition is still suffering high casualties from the fighting, but as long as they can maintain unmolested supply lines and functioning fighting positions on the frontlines, they stand a good change of securing their gains.

Regime Reinforcements Arrive

It seems this will be put to the test over the coming days, as regime reinforcements have finally begun entering Aleppo city. Additional units of the Military Intelligence and the Russian-back 25th Division arrived in Aleppo throughout the afternoon and evening of November 28. Meanwhile, Major General Suhail Hassan - the recently appointed commander of Syria’s Special Forces - was pictured directing new tank and infantry units at the Hamdaniyah Roundabout in the evening. Pro-regime media also reported the deployment of Iranian-backed Local Defense Forces from the Aleppo countryside and the arrival of the 4th Armored Division’s 42nd Brigade during the night (the brigade played a large role in the initial capture of west Aleppo in late 2019).

Pro-regime pages began announcing a series of successful counter attacks throughout the night. Loyalist have claimed the recapture of Dadikh, Kafr Battikh, and Tarnaba (effectively rolling back all of the opposition’s Saraqib gains and re-opening the highway to the city). Others have claimed that Bashnatrah and Bashqatin were recaptured, though it is unclear how, as these two villages sit west of Mansoura and Kafr Dael and south of Yaqid Adas. These claims have been made with no video or picture evidence, and may just as easily be morale-boosting propaganda as have any truth to them. However, it does seem clear that the regime has finally mobilized its first wave of reinforcements to the city.

As November 29th dawns, the opposition is likely to concentrate its forces on three axes. First, on Saraqib, opposition units may continue to try to take the city or simply work to expand their control over the highway (assuming the regime’s claims of recapturing the villages are untrue). Second, on the southern axis of west Aleppo, opposition forces will likely try to expand their line eastward towards Khan Touman and, most importantly, el-Eis. Capturing the strategic el-Eis town and hill would be key for securing this rapidly growing southern flank, but may also prove to require extensive opposition resources. Finally, the opposition will likely begin to focus on the Anadan front, perhaps advancing directly on the city or attempting to cut it off by flanking north or south. Fatah Mubin may also be hoping to time this advance with a potential opening of the Syrian National Army frontline in Afrin and Tel Rifaat, which would help divert regime resources in this area.

Two days into Operation “Deterring the Aggression”, the opposition has secured major gains and appears on the verge of achieving more. However, the next two days will likely prove critical in determining just how sustainable these advances are. In addition to the question of Turkey’s future role in this offensive, the major questions now are if and when the Russians up their air sorties, and whether the regime’s new reinforcements and much-hyped initial advances prove viable.

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For its part, the regime has regularly shelled Idlib since the very beginning of the February 2020 “ceasefire” and Russian warplanes have routinely conducted heightened periods of bombing runs across civilian areas. More recently, the Russian military has begun supplying regime forces with an excessive amount of FPV and suicide drones - the same models used in Ukraine. These drones have completely changed the dynamic in Idlib, amplifying the regime’s ability to spread terror among civilians and strike small, mobile military units. Fatah Mubin has framed its current operation as a response to these regime and Russian escalatory attacks, the most recent of which left four children dead when regime forces shelled a school in Ariha.

Day 1

The operation began with a combined arms assault across multiple axes. FM pushed infantry forward in BMPs and their DIY armored personnel carriers, all supported by tanks while artillery and suicide drones prepped regime positions. First line units were quickly followed by mortar and ATGM crews who could set up on newly captured areas. The frontline appears to range from the Regiment 46 Base in the south to the Sheikh Aqil region in the north. This part of the west Aleppo front has seen none of the FM raids that became commonplace over the past two years. It also provides the only elevated approach to Aleppo city, as the land south of Regiment 46 is more defined by open farmland. This northern front also places the FM advance very close to the territory controlled by the other anti-Assad coalition, the Syrian National Army, and it Turkish military backer.

Video of FM suicide drone hitting regime position on the morning of November 27, posted by majd832250

In the south, FM forces pushed through the poultry farms on the northwest side of Regiment 46, quickly overwhelming the undermanned base. Credible reports have emerged that the attack began with a suicide car bomb against frontline regime positions, followed by the mechanized infantry push. No group has claimed responsibility for the bombing, and given HTS’s insistence on ending such practices after the battles in 2019 and 2020 it was likely the attack was conducted by one of the few semi-independent foreign factions remaining in Idlib. After clearing the base, opposition forces pushed through to Orem Saghir and Orem Khabir.

As sun set, some FM units continued eastward along Highway 60, with credible claims the opposition captured Kafr Naha around 9:00pm (Navvar Şaban claims the village was heavily IED’d and took extra time to sweep). Fighters on this front claimed the regime forces retreated all the way to Khan Assal, the last major fortified area outside of Aleppo city’s western neighborhoods. Regime forces likely hoped to regroup and organize a defensive position here, but reports suggest FM units began assaulting the town late at night on the 27th.

To the north, opposition forces quickly advanced to Qabtan al-Jabal and Hawar along the Highway 62 axis, with credible reports that Bashnatrah was liberated around the same time as Kafr Naha. These advances put the main regime defensive line early on November 28th at Anadan in the north, Kafr Dael in the center, and Khan Assal in the south.

Casualty estimates are still very early, but so far Trenton Schoenborn has documented at least 46 opposition fighters killed while I have found at least 33 regime deaths reported by pro-regime media. The regime losses include a colonel, three majors, and four captains, many of whom served in the 105th Brigade and 30th Divisions of the regime’s Republican Guard. Nearly all of the reported regime deaths so far come from core regime regions of Latakia, Tartous, Hama, and Homs. This means that we are likely seeing the commanders of platoons and companies stationed along the front, and the soldiers under them - many of whom are conscripts from more far-flung provinces - have not been reported yet in pro-regime media. Put simply, the high number of mid-rank officers among the documented dead suggests many more regime soldiers were killed (Liwa al-Quds - which has taken confirmed losses via pictures from the front - has not reported any of its dead yet as well). Opposition forces also managed to ambush and kill a group of Russian special forces soldiers and captured at least three tanks as well.

Implications

Why has this offensive been so successful so far? Fatah Mubin’s ability to generally keep the details of the attack secret has played a large role, and the group continues to show a much improved degree of operational security throughout this offensive than in years past. But the regime has also suffered manpower issues along this front, making it a prime target. The west Aleppo countryside is manned largely by elements of the 30th Republican Guard Division, a newer unit formed after the regime captured Aleppo city in 2016 and designed to bring a variety of pro-regime forces under a single command. However, pro-regime complaint pages have for many years complained about the widespread practice of ‘tafyish’ here - paying bribes to unit commanders for extended leave. This has caused many positions to be severely undermanned, as much of each deployed unit has actually paid their way back home. Undermanned, lower tier units caught off guard fled at the first sign of contact, many seem to have been killed, others captured. The regime, as usual, has relied on its artillery and air force to try and blunt the advance. Many of the opposition dead have been killed this way (though there are several pictures showing opposition infantry ambushed and killed during the attack as well).

All of this is to say that it has been less than 24 hours since northwest Syria’s first offensive in four years began. Rapid opposition advances are quite common, the difficulty always comes in the ensuing days as the advance slows and both sides dig in. The opposition cannot beat the regime in a war of attrition. It does not matter how much more skilled opposition fighters might be when the regime can call on tens of thousands of conscripts to push into a single front. Even in the best case scenario where FM units breach the Aleppo city suburbs, it is difficult to see how it does not become a repeat of the opposition’s failed 2016 attempt to lift the siege of Aleppo. Supply lines stretching from Idlib to the city are easy targets for Russian and Syria jets while the regime is able to send wave after wave of infantry at limited opposition resources.

This same pattern played out five years ago, when opposition fighters conducted a promising counter-attack in northwest Hama, re-capturing Hamamiyat and Tel Malah. Elite units hunkered down in these positions for weeks, repelling multiple regime pushes. Eventually the regime simply pounded the fortified positions with artillery for days on end, most of the fighters were killed, the positions re-captured by the regime, and the front collapsed shortly thereafter. It is difficult not to see the same thing playing out now, whether over the course of a few days or a few weeks.

However, today the Turkish military is far more enmeshed in northwest Syria than it was in 2019. Not only does it maintain a ring of observation points around Idlib and bases inside northern Aleppo, it has also served as the main guarantor of the 2020 “ceasefire” since reaching the deal with Russia. That ceasefire is now broken. What Turkey decides to do will almost certainly determine the outcome of this offensive. Fatah Mubin is likely hoping that by achieving massive success early on they can force Turkey’s hand into helping defend the new gains, or perhaps greenlight a SNA offensive from the Afrin axis (which just happens to border the northern side of the FM advance).

Diplomatically, Turkey could work to attain a new deal with Russia that sees this new frontline frozen, or a partial withdraw of FM forces in exchange for an end to the FPV attacks. Militarily, a Turkish-imposed no-fly-zone would go a long way to secure opposition gains, while a Turkish offensive of their own against the joint regime-Kurdish controlled regions north of Aleppo city would force the regime to significantly disperse its forces.

It is clear is that the rules of the last four years have been broken. This is almost certainly Jolani’s core goal in launching the offensive. With Syria ‘frozen’ no more, anyone who shape new facts on the ground has a chance to create a new set of rules going forward.

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In early 2021 a rare biography was published by a pro-regime Facebook page. Over 6,000 words long, the post tells the story of Republican Guard Brigadier Kamal Atiyeh, who was paralyzed in October 2015 during fighting in Deir Ez Zor. The story details not just his personal role in the war but that of other units involved in the same battles he fought in, first in Douma in May 2011, then Homs in summer 2012, and finally for three years in Deir Ez Zor.

Each of these events will be given their own installment. The first focuses on the Republican Guard’s response to protests in Douma, their initial deployment to the city in May, “confronting protestors” that spring, creating a ring of checkpoints around the city, and culminating in the regime’s first major military offensive in Eastern Ghouta in January 2012. The second installment will look at Homs city from June through September 2012, when Atiyeh’s battalion deployed to support operations in the city following the regime’s ethnic cleansing of several neighborhoods earlier in the year. The final installment will look at Deir Ez Zor from late 2012 through October 2015, when the 104th Brigade deployed the bulk of its forces to the Euphrates to battle the rapidly growing armed revolution and the besieging of regime forces within Deir Ez Zor city.

The account has been transcribed below, unedited in order to preserve its authenticity. Of course, the account claims the protesters were violent, the security forces unarmed and restrained. This is an unsurprising narrative. But a close read shows that even within this pro-regime spin, the account still admits to several long-standing accusations against it. I will periodically interject with additional context or to highlight these important aspects of the passage.

Douma, April 2011

Kamal Atiyeh was born in an Alawite village in the Safita countryside of Tartous on January 3, 1966. He joined the Military College in 1985 and was assigned to the Republican Guard upon graduating in 1988. He graduated through several advanced courses in the ensuing decades, including the famous “Thunderbolt” course in 1995. When the revolution began, Atiyeh, now a colonel, was commanding the 104th Brigade’s 3rd Battalion, serving directly under the infamous war criminals Brigadier Ali Khuzam and Brigadier Issam Zahredinne.

“With the beginning of the global war on Syria and the events that the country witnessed, the 104th Brigade, led by the defector Manaf Tlass, and its Chief of Staff, the martyr General Issam Zahreddine, and the commander of the 3rd Mechanized Battalion, General Kamal Atiyah, were assigned to work in the city of Douma to support the security forces, confront the demonstrators, restore security, and preserve state institutions and citizens’ livelihoods from the tampering and sabotage of the Takfiri groups.

At that moment they had no idea about the work and what was coming next, they went to Douma in civilian clothes without any kind of weapon, they were distributed to the municipality roundabout [where protests and sit-ins had been held since March], the court, the women's prison and the main street towards the Grand Mosque in the center of Douma.”

“2011 AD After the end of Friday prayers, the worshipers left the mosques of Douma towards the square of the Grand Mosque. Their number exceeded 10,000, and the army personnel did not exceed 250. They headed towards the municipality roundabout. Voices began to rise, "Freedom... Freedom." At that time, the army personnel were distributed on the right and left of the main street. When these mercenaries arrived, they threw sidewalk stones and iron bars at the army personnel and beat them without mercy. An atmosphere of chaos was created and the personnel were withdrawn from the side streets towards the municipality roundabout and the police station. At that time, a large number of personnel were injured.

The demonstrators had arrived at the women's prison and the court and set fire to the court, and the outer section of the women's prison, the office of the director of the prison, and administrative offices and smashed a number of shops

On the same day at 3 pm, General Issam Zahreddine, General Ali Khuzam, General Kamal Atiyah and a number of officers and men were assigned to enter the main street and reach the women’s prison and remove the prisoners from it. At that time, they stormed the prison with cars, and the prisoners were taken out by a qualitative operation carried out by these heroes and those with them. At that moment, the first mission of General Kamal Atiyah came to an end, and then they all returned to the brigade.

After the end of the first mission and the burning of the court by terrorists, the leadership took a decision to intensify the presence of the Republican Guard in Douma every Friday in civilian clothes to calm the demonstrations. But those groups were not as peaceful as they claimed, they declared rebellion and threatened and killed every collaborator with the state and threw the bodies near the roundabout of the martyrs. They wrote on the bodies, "This is the fate of every agent and collaborator with the state and the regime."

The Douma Courthouse was partially burned on April 23, 2011. Some opposition accounts claimed the regime forces set fire to the building, other locals suspected loyalist shabiha groups were behind the attack. This arson attack occurred extremely early during the protest movement, at a time when, as one local remembers, everyone went to great pains to keep the protests civil and pure so as not to give the regime any excuse to retaliate. The 104th Brigade was likely deployed to support the existing police and mukhabarat forces in the city following this incident, as indicated in the account. These forces were initially deployed in the center of the city at key points along the main road where weekly protests and funerals for those killed by security forces were held each Friday. Regime snipers now used the courthouse rooftop after the arson attack to fire on protestors in the street below, and two days after the arson attack three soldiers were reported killed in an ambush in the city.

Most notably, the account twice admits that Republican Guard soldiers - not just shabiha - were deployed in plain clothes to “confront the demonstrators” during this period. The account also claims that the soldiers in the city were unarmed at this time. However, a full month earlier, on March 25, security forces attacked for the first time a peaceful protest in the city, beating people with stun batons. Then, on April 1, security members dressed in civilian clothes shot and killed eight protestors, according to Human Rights Watch. One resident recalls this month as one of rapid escalation by security forces, with soldiers becoming extremeley aggressive against the protests, storming the crowds and detaining anyone they could.

“At the beginning of the fifth month, after the increase in kidnappings and killings in Douma, the leadership took the decision to deploy the army in military uniform and set up barriers at the exits and entrances of Douma. The Military Technical Institute was made a headquarters for the forces, setting up barriers and running patrols. A reserve group was kept whose mission was to intervene quickly during situations that were difficult to control easily. This group succeeded greatly in calming the demonstrations and controlling them. All of this without weapons, due to the leadership’s directives not to use weapons.

This matter prompted the terrorists to rebel and revive external agendas, including Abu Ali Khabeya in Douma and Ali Afouf’s group in Harasta. Their mission was to threaten, kidnap, kill and torture anyone who dealt with the Syrian state. The notables of Douma did not succeed in calming the situation, but rather the tension increased and women's demonstrations began to appear at night.”

Local activist accounts reported on April 29 that security forces had, for the first time, established a ring of checkpoints around the city, attempting to cut Douma off from the surrounding communities. On May 4 activists reported that additional army units had established themselves along the main street through central Douma. Soldiers began storming the houses of people they suspected had participated in protests. The regime also began cutting the city’s internet and telephone lines each Thursday evening and Friday to try and limit the spread of protests. According to the account, the 104th Brigade established its headquarters are the “Military Technical Institute”, also known as the Vehicle Management Base, which sits between Harasta and Irbeen along Highway 5 just south of Douma.

Of course, the account repeatedly frames security forces as being peaceful, attacked unprovoked by violent locals, yet funerals were being held regularly in Douma throughout April and May for civilians killed by regime forces. The account claims locals were murdering “collaborators” - locals who worked with the intelligence agencies to kidnap men and women involved in protests, who would then be tortured and often murdered in regime prisons. Yet even in its own skewed narrative the regime author does not accuse local armed groups of killing innocent people.

The account indirectly mentions the formation of more organized and armed anti-Assad groups as a response to this military crackdown on the city, specifically under the command of “Abu Ali Khabeya”. According to a local, the first “Free Syrian Army” groups organized in the city were mostly just unarmed young men in masks who would surround the nightly women’s protests to try and protect them from security forces. Mohammed Saeed Wanly (Abu Rashid) was "one of the founders of the Free Syrian Army in Damascus and its countryside, especially in Douma" and helped form the Abu Ubaidah Amer bin al-Jarrah Battalion in September 2011. This group conducted many operations in Douma as well as the broader East Ghouta region. It is unclear what role Khabeya had in the battalion, but in 2012 the unit formed local affiliates like the Martyrs of Rukn al-Din Battalion (which Abu Rashid would lead) and the Martyrs of Douma Battalion (which Khabeya would lead). Khabeya was detained and executed by Jaish al-Islam in 2015 .

Douma, June through August 2011

The security crackdown within Douma city pushed the armed opposition groups into the countryside, where they were more free to organize and grow. This resulted in the expansion of the military conflict from within Douma city into the broader Douma region.

“At the beginning of the sixth month, incitement against Syria increased, and armed groups began to form the so-called Free Army. They were secretly stationed in the farms outside Douma and took advantage of sunset and darkness to shoot at checkpoints randomly and force the soldiers to flee. The army was instructed not to use any type of weapon.

This situation lasted about three months, and Douma was divided militarily into two parts: the northern and western divisions of the 106th Brigade led by General Muhammad Khaddour, and the eastern and southern divisions, for the 104th Brigade led by General Issam Zahreddine.

The Free Army began to increase in the city of Douma, in the farms and in Eastern Ghouta, and the betrayals [defections] increased, and false information was sent to the army and security services, which led to an increase in kidnappings, killings and the spread of chaos, accompanied by an increase in attacks on checkpoints, the army and security.”

The account attempts to paint a picture of a rapidly expanding violent insurgency throughout the summer. Yet the regime’s own funeral records - which were routinely published at the time - reported only 34 deaths of security forces across Damascus between April and August 2011. Of these, 16 can be definitively linked to East Ghouta, with only five occurring in Douma. It was not until later in the fall that opposition forces grew strong enough to inflict more regular casualties on security forces. Meanwhile, regime security forces were themselves becoming increasingly violent. Locals had already recorded 40 civilian deaths in Douma by May 8, 2011 - less than two months into protest movement. By late 2011 snipers were operating around the corniche, shooting randomly on locals. As one resident recalls, children stopped going to school around this time out of fear of the snipers. Many families that could, fled to the East Ghouta countryside, slipping past the ring of checkpoints to find safety in the farms.

Douma and its Environs, January 2012 Operation

Regime combat casualties began to steadily increase starting in October as the increasingly armed opposition began to liberate their towns in rural East Ghouta. The rapid growth of opposition-held territory triggered the first serious regime operation across East Ghouta in late January 2012. While the account claims these events happened “in the eleventh month [November 2011]” there is no evidence that such a largescale operation occurred at this time. Local activists reported in late December that the army was building up units and increasing its bombing of towns in preparation for a large operation, which appears to have been initiated in the last week of January 2012. It was around this time that the army began using mortars and rockets to shell Douma and the countryside, again forcing residents to flee the city. The account gives a detailed description of the army’s advance south from Douma, led by the 104th Brigade with support from the 106th Brigade, 4th Division, and intelligence branches:

“The eleventh month: The first organized attack against the army at the Shifouniya junction checkpoint. The militants’ attacks on the army points increased at that time, and in light of the repeated attacks by the militants, the command took the decision to unload heavy and medium military equipment (tanks, BMP vehicles, and mortars) to reinforce the army’s presence. From here, the confrontation became a military one against the militants.

The army began raiding and attacking the militants' hideouts in Douma farms because they are the most widespread places for them, and the nature of the raid was not easy due to the high walls of the farms.

Armed groups began to take complete control of the villages of Ghouta and attack police stations, government departments and some military units. The leadership took the decision to launch a military operation towards the villages of Ghouta with military equipment.

The 104th Brigade in Douma was again assigned, led by General Issam Zahreddine, General Ali Khazam, General Kamal Attia and others, to move from Douma towards "Misraba - Madira - Beit Sawa - Hamouria - Saqba". Groups were formed and equipment was prepared, including tanks, BMP vehicles and mortars. Morale was very high.

When the movement from Douma towards Misraba began, the Free Syrian Army militants had blocked all roads with 3-meter-high earthen barriers. Army groups with military equipment began storming the buildings to the left and right of the main entrance to Misraba. The militants' resistance was strong and they relied on booby-trapping the barriers and placing booby-trapped cars in the streets. At the end of the day, Misraba was completely controlled, due to the determination and insistence of the Syrian army forces. The next morning, army units continued advancing towards Madira. The resistance was less than Misraba and it fell within hours. The army continued towards Beit Sawa.

In Beit Sawa, an army man was shot in the neck while he was with General Ali Khazam, which led to his martyrdom. At that point, General Ali Khazam realized that the gunman who shot the martyr was stationed in a two-story building. He went with three elements and captured the gunman alive. All the gunmen in Beit Sawa were dealt with, the area was taken over, and the brigade forces continued moving towards Hamouria. High morale played a major role in the success of the battles.

The 104th Brigade continued its advance from Beit Sawa towards Hamouria, which is considered one of the major cities and a gathering center for the opposition and the Free Army. The 106th Brigade advanced from Madira towards Hamouria.

The Syrian army was able to advance from two axes, forcing the militants to withdraw towards Saqba. General Kamal and his colleagues remained in Hamouria for a whole day, and about 75-100 people from the locals were present in their homes. The army's main mission was to expel the militants and arrest the wanted persons. The next morning, the army continued to advance towards Saqba, which is adjacent to the Hamouria buildings. The resistance was stronger.

General Issam Zahreddine divided the city into sectors for the attacking groups and General Kamal's mission was to advance towards the city center "the Great Mosque". He was accompanied by a BMP vehicle and this neighborhood is full of old Arab houses and narrow streets and behind the mosque the first field hospital was discovered and the search continued and another field hospital was discovered and a large warehouse containing all the flags and banners and (a model of the Homs clock) made of wood about 4 meters high (attached to the pictures)

A third and fourth field hospital were discovered and a black Free Army uniform with the Free Army logo on it and a large number of booby-trapped and stolen cars were seized. All this is to complete the scenes of media fabrication by the militants that they started since the beginning of the war on Syria.

The TV documented everything and the army set up checkpoints in Hamouria and Saqba and the next morning continued to advance towards Arbin from the east (Hamouria) towards Arbin. The army entered Arbin from more than one axis and remained there until the next morning.

The army continued the mission within the city and the militants were stationed next to the Great Mosque in Arbin was taken over and the militants fled towards Jisreen and Deir al-Asafir and General Kamal and his colleagues remained in Arbin for three days, with some forces settling in Hamouria, Arbin, Saqba, Beit Sawa and Misraba in the form of checkpoints”

Kamal Atiyeh’s role in East Ghouta appears to end here, his battalion largely redeployed to the northern Qalamoun shortly after this offensive. The operation succeeded in returning much of western East Ghouta to regime control by January 30, 2012. It was the first true military operation in Damascus, but within a few months the opposition was able to re-organize and mount its own, bigger offensive against regime territory in East Ghouta, West Ghouta, South Damascus, and the city itself. Douma, meanwhile was still surrounded by a ring of checkpoints, existing under a semi-siege with security forces stationed in all the city’s large buildings. As 2012 wore on, the regime began to increasingly use jets and helicopters to bomb the residents. It was not until November 2012 that armed opposition groups managed to liberate the city, reconnecting Douma with the rest of East Ghouta and enabling many of its residents to return home for the first time in months.

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Playing a central role in this week-long operation was Colonel Suhail Hassan, commander of the Air Force Intelligence’s Special Operations Department. Dara’a was just the first of many deployments for his unit. Over the next 18 months, the Special Operations Department would travel across western Syria, killing and detaining protestors and armed opposition fighters in the cities and countrysides of Homs and Hama. These early deployments and the massacres the unit is linked to can be traced via two posthumous biographies of Yusuf Abdul Latif Hammad, one of the soldiers fighting under Hassan.

A short biography was published by a community page from Hammad’s hometown nearly two years after his death, providing a brief overview of the man’s first and last actions in the war. It clearly links Hammad to Colonel Suhail Hassan’s command and places his unit at the March 18, 2011 Dara’a massacre as well as the September 2012 demolition of the Masha’ al-Arbaeen neighborhood in Hama.

“In honor of the martyrs and to commemorate their names and sacrifices, the primary school in the village of Sighata was named after the martyred hero paratrooper Yousef Abdul Latif Hammad, to become the martyr Yousef Abdul Latif Hammad School for Basic Education. Here we recall a brief biography of the martyred hero Yousef Abdul Latif Hammad. He was born in the village of Sighata - Masyaf - Hama on 2/1/1988. He was one of the heroes of the special mission group that came from Damascus under the leadership of the Tiger [Suhail Hassan]. He began military action against the Takfiri groups in Daraa on 18/3/2011. He was wounded four times, but that did not deter him from continuing his national duty in fighting the Takfiri groups. On 6/9/2012, one of the terrorist hideouts in the Masha’ al-Arbaeen area in the city of Hama was attacked. An armed group, or a number of them, were present at the door during the storming and siege of the area by soldiers, who made them believe that they would surrender themselves. When one of the army's heroes approached the house, the terrorists betrayed him, and it became clear to the soldiers that it was an ambush intended to trap the group. The falcon set off alone towards the house where his comrade was injured, trying to save him. He clashed with the terrorists and killed them. However, a treacherous sniper was watching the den from afar. He fired his treacherous bullet, which was the reason for his ascension. The martyred paratrooper Youssef Abdul Latif Hammad, a hero who is still immortal, a school of heroism and manhood.”

A more detailed biography was published by a pro-regime news page on the one year anniversary of his death. This post provides some specific dates and locations where Hammad was injured, as well as a list of major operations he took part in - again, all under the command of Colonel Suhail Hassan and the Air Force Intelligence:

“The story of the martyr paratrooper Youssef Abdul Latif Hammad, who was described by his comrades as the Falcon of Air Intelligence. The martyr was born 1/2/1988 in the village of Sighata - Masyaf - Hama. He was part of the special missions group that came from Damascus under the leadership of Colonel ******”

Hammad was first injured in Khanazir, Hama, on September 14, 2011 and again on March 20, 2012 in the Maghara hamlet just south of Halfaya. His unit later moved to Hama city where he was injured in Al-Hamidiyah neighborhood on June 3, 2012 before receiving his fourth injury in Tremseh sometime after that. In addition to these deployments, the biography claims Hammad and his unit fought in Rastan, Homs after their Dara’a deployment, then moved to Baba Amr before spending the rest of his time in the Hama countryside, including fighting in Khan Sheikhoun.

It is possible to piece together a partial deployment history of Hammad and his unit, clearly placing Suhail Hassan’s Air Force Intelligence unit at four documented massacres during the first year and a half of the war.

• March 18, 2011: the unit arrived in Dara’a city, participating in the documented killing of 36 protestors over the following six days.

• May 29, 2011: The unit then deployed to Rastan, Homs, likely participating in the May 29 to June 3, 2011 regime operation (the second regime operation in Rastan, the siege of Rastan, began in late September at which point Hammad was fighting in northern Hama). According to Human Rights Watch, regime forces killed 75 people in Rastan and shelled mosques, cemeteries, bakeries, and homes over the course of five days. This was part of a broader regime deployment across the Homs governorate which saw hundreds of civilians killed and thousands detained over the spring and summer months.

• July 2011: After one month in Rastan, Hammad deployed to Bab Amr, placing his unit in the neighborhood in early July 2011. Human Rights Watch documented five protestors killed by security forces in Wa`er, Khalidiyya, and Bab Amr neighborhoods on July 15 alone. However, it is more likely that Hammad’s unit was involved in raids and detention against activists and armed opposition fighters at this time.

• September 14, 2011: Hammad’s unit had left Homs for Hama, deploying to the village of Khanazir in the southwestern countryside by mid-September where Hammad received his first injury. He spent the next six months in recovery before rejoining his unit in March near Mahradeh, northern Hama. The northern Hama countryside and adjacent Jabal Zawiyah region of Idlib had become hotbeds of opposition protest and armed activity during the fall of 2011. According to documents released by the Center for International Justice and Accountability, on September 4, 2011, the regime’s Central Crisis Management Cell (CCMC) assigned the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior with overseeing a new operation in northern Hama. Hammad’s unit had likely been tasked with supporting this Ministry of Defense-led campaign in northern Hama.

• March 20, 2012: Hammad was again injured during an operation targeting “a foreign fighter hideout” in the hamlet of Maghara, just south of Halfaya in the northern Hama countryside.

• May 2012: On May 15, 2012 regime forces in Khan Sheikhoun killed more than two dozen protestors in response to an IED attack near a security checkpoint inside the city. In response, local anti-government factions besieged the intelligence office (protected at the time with a BMP and T-72 tank). Hammad’s biography claims that his unit deployed to Khan Sheikhoun to help “lift the siege”.

• June 3, 2012: Hammad is injured during clashes in the Al-Hamidiyah neighborhood of Hama City.

• July 12, 2012: Hammad’s biography states that after the Hama city fighting, his unit deployed to the village of Tremseh, where he was wounded again. This likely places his unit at the July 12 massacre, in which government forces and local militia fighters besieged and stormed the village, killing, detaining, and looting throughout the day. An investigation by the U.N.’s Commission of Inquiry confirmed the deaths of at least 46 people, with 15 more missing and 100 detained by regime forces. Nearly 20 homes and four shops were looted and burnt down during the attack.

• September 6, 2012: Hammad was killed during the regime’s operations in Masha’ al-Arbaeen neighborhood of Hama city. Security forces cordoned off the neighborhood, “shelling the area with artillery and mortars before entering.” According to Human Rights Watch, regime forces then levelled the neighborhood over the next two months, evicting the remaining residents and ensuring none could ever return.

All four of Syria’s intelligence branches played central roles in the regime’s counter-revolution in 2011 and 2012. However, the Air Force Intelligence (AFI) stands out as the most important in both disrupting opposition insurgent activity and in killing and detaining civilians and peaceful activists. Army defectors have, in the years since, recounted the AFI’s role in disrupting their plans for mass defections throughout late 2011 and 2012, highlighting the defectors’ inability to penetrate the extremely siloed and sectarian structure of the AFI, compared with the more permeable Military Intelligence and General Intelligence Directorates.

Beyond the AFI’s legitimate counter-insurgency actions, the directorate was also central in propping up armed loyalist militias and - as Hammad’s biography shows - deploying across the country to violently suppress peaceful protests. Human Rights Watch’s December 2011 report “By All Means Necessary” documents multiple massacres and mass arrests committed by the AFI in general, and by Suhail Hassan and the Special Operations Department in particular. This includes beating, detaining, and shooting protestors in Moadamiyeh in April 2011 and in Daraya in June.

Suhail Hassan would gradually turn his AFI unit into a powerful militia network, empowering local warlords across Hama’s Alawite belt as well as integrating veteran members of the Homs National Defense Forces Center - itself responsible for many crimes against civilians in Homs throughout 2011 and 2012. The “Tiger Forces”, as they soon became known, have since been accused of countless crimes against Syria’s civilians - from arbitrary detention, beatings, theft, and murder to the systematic use of chemical weapons. They evolved once more in August 2019, when the now Russian-backed formation became the 25th Division and entered a prolonged period of restructuring and expanding. Suhail Hassan remained in command of this unit, receiving a promotion to major general, until April 2024 when he was dismissed and assigned to command the regime’s battered Special Forces. Yet no matter their different names or appearance over the years, the units under Suhail Hassan’s command have continued the legacy of criminality that began long before Yusuf Hammad’s death.