• Aleppo and Idlib

• Damascus

• Coast

• Homs

• Hama

Violence dropped this week following a series of sectarian-linked killings over the previous two weeks. The most notable attack came in rural Tartous, where two Alawi men were killed in a targeted shooting near their village. Both men were well-known drug criminals (several Facebook posts by locals over the previous months had denounced their actions) and the killings were likely linked to their criminal activity, not sect. Several men were also arrested or charged in relation to past killings and kidnappings this week.

Security forces arrested eight regime-era criminals in operations across Hama and the coast this week. Most of the men were linked to the Air Force Intelligence or Tiger Forces. Two ISIS members were also arrested in western Homs, in the same town where the bus of Alawi workers was attacked two weeks ago.

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Early this spring I visited one of the Alawi towns in southern Masyaf, on the edge of the Houla region of western Homs. From here north to Idlib lies an old patchwork of frontlines from the early years of the war, where the Sunni-dominated low-lands meet the Alawi-dominated foothills. The borders of these towns endured dozens of massacres and violations throughout the war, which now fuel retributive violence – often indiscriminate.

Following is a partial transcript of an interview I conducted with an Alawi family in one of these villages along the Houla-Masyaf border. The interviewees included a former conscript and his parents, all of whom were still too afraid to leave their town at the time of the meeting.

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Post-Assad, Damascus has shifted most local authority to the district administrative bodies which oversee these municipal officials. In 2025, these positions and their exact authorities were still being established, likely resulting in the government’s lack of involvement in (re)appointing municipal leadership. Today, however, the government is more robust and now able to carry out this duty.

Syrians have taken notice, and many are keeping a close eye on who exactly will be appointed. Amid widespread questions over the new government’s long-term intentions and competency, these appointments are being used as a litmus test for Damascus’ seriousness in supporting competent technocrats over political loyalists.

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One prominent Facebook page covering news in Homs’ Houla region (officially called the Taldou District) wrote last month that, “The latest issue being discussed in the aforementioned regions is the administrative appointment of mayors, which is now the talk of the councils and the subject of negotiations.” Taldou is a mixed district with a Sunni center and Alawi, Christian, and Murshdi countryside. Significant inter-sect tensions persists as a result of the 2012 massacre against Houla’s Sunnis, and the 2025 killings of nearby Alawis.

The page warns that several pro-revolution locals of Houla are endorsing four mayoral candidates of Alawi and Christian towns, despite them “ have a history of dealing with the former regime and are party [Baath] members.” The post goes on to say they hope the District Director, “does not listen to those around him who stand to benefit from the names they are endorsing.” The subtext is clear: some Sunnis from Houla are accused of using their connections to the district administration to support specific candidates in minority villages for some form of compensation.

Concerns over corruption within the appointment process or a prioritization of loyalty over competency seem to be widespread, based on my conversations with people across western Syria last month. Heightening the stakes is the fact that this year’s appointments will also see the reinstatement of municipal and sub-district councils. These councils have not operated in most of the country since the collapse of the Assad regime. Instead, town mayors and subdistrict directors have coordinated with the district-level administrative departments on services and governance issues. Re-appointing these councils should, theoretically, strengthen local governments’ ability to address administrative and service challenges.

“It is unclear how the councils will be chosen,” one community activist in rural Tartous told me recently, “but if the government lets us elect the councils it will hugely increase trust.” Unfortunately, the government did not prepare for local elections of this sort. Instead, mayoral and council appointments are being conducted via each district director, the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment, and the governor’s office. The process for this year seems to involve district directors suggesting names to the governorate branch of the Ministry of Local Administration for study, which then presents its final suggestions to the governor for approval.

Under the Assad regime, towns elected their councils and mayors from a list of candidates approved by the Baath Party. Naturally, all of the options were Baath loyalists. In post-Baath Syria, where many governance systems still rely on Baath-era laws, locals are unclear how this year’s process will play out. “There is no clear basis for selection,” says the Tartous activist, “What are the required qualifications? How will the candidates be chosen? Right now, at the very least, they must choose the right people for the list.”

Several activists in Tartous and Latakia warned me last month that pro-Assad propaganda networks are hoping to use these selections to further undermine the government. “If the wrong people are appointed, it will have a huge backlash in our community and be manipulated by those outside the country,” one man warned. The appointment of known corrupt individuals or people without strong professional backgrounds will be used by these networks to further claim the new Syrian government is not serious about governing Alawi areas.

This dynamic is already playing out in Latakia, which began appointing new mayors last week. According to several locals I spoke with, Fadi Saqr has successfully pushed out mayors who are not loyal to him by abusing his connections with various local officials in the governorate. Among these mayors are men who have played central roles in combatting ex-Assad insurgent networks and supporting Ministry of Interior trust-building efforts in their towns. Fadi Saqr’s successful campaigns against them have further entrenched the belief among Latakia’s Alawis that Damascus has appointed Saqr as “our new warlord,” as many have expressed to me over the past year.

Syria’s new government is still suffering from a significant resource deficit and major structural deficiencies inherited from the Assad regime. Despite many criticisms to the contrary, the country remains highly decentralized, with national and even, to an extent, governorate-level authorities delegating many decisions to subordinates.

Leaders in Damascus may think that municipal appointments are an insignificant issue when compared to larger economic, foreign policy, reconstruction, and security challenges. However, it is these kinds of small details that often have outsized impacts in domestic trust building and social stability. Syrian officials should ensure that proper oversight and attention is paid to this year’s appointments to prevent a further erosion of domestic trust, while also working towards a system of local elections for next year’s appointments that would shift responsibility to the communities themselves.

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Announcements of security deployments mostly in western Syria, with an emphasis on the minority regions. This weekly update is intended to provide base level data for more holistic research into the rebuilding of the security and governance structures of post-Assad Syria. Direct links to primary sources are provided throughout.

• Aleppo and Idlib

• Damascus

• Coast

• Homs

• Hama

The past two weeks saw three serious violent acts across the country. Three Alawi men were killed in targeted assassinations across two towns in western Hama in a single day, seven Alawi workers were killed when their public service bus was shot in western Homs, and four Sunni civilians were killed when their service bus was shot in rural Damascus. Several other individual killings occurred across the country as well.

For their part, security forces arrested several men accused of recent murders, as well as many criminal gangs involved in theft and drug smuggling. Two regime-era officers were also arrested. Counter Terrorism units arrested a large number of ISIS members and commanders in a coordinated, multi-province operation and dismantled a Hezbollah-linked cell planning attacks on Israel from southern Syria.

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I recently published an interview with the mayor of Mushrefa, a mixed-sect town in northern Homs, in which we discussed the gender-segregation status of that town’s Christian/Sunni/Alawi schools. Earlier this month, I met with a teacher who works in an all-Alawi school in rural Jableh. The following excerpt of that interview covers our discussion on curriculum changes under the new government, gender segregation, and resource challenges in the new school year.

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• Aleppo and Idlib

• Damascus

• Coast

• Homs

• Hama

This week saw a continuation of the widespread arrest campaign of regime-era officers. The arrests continue to target high-level officers, particularly Air Force and intelligence members. The Ministry of Interior announced seven batches of arrests across Damascus, Homs, and the coast, resulting in at least 11 detained men. Among them are six former Syrian Air Force officers.

Killings remained limited this week, with the most significant event being the killing of two Shia farmers in the Qusayr countryside. This killing came just a few days after gunmen killed an off-duty soldier in the same area. In Homs City, security forces conducted a two-day drug enforcement operation, dismantling a nine-person drug gang in the city.

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Before Ma’sara gained notoriety across Idlib, it was first used to terrorize the residents of Muhambal. The checkpoint’s history serves as a microcosm of the revolution across Idlib: established in July 2011 as a part of the regime’s first military operation in the governorate, the checkpoint gradually grew in size and importance as regime forces were forced out of remote positions in the countryside and consolidated along the international highway. It would be one of the final regime holdouts in the governorate, not falling until after the liberation of Idlib City, Jisr Shoughur, and Ariha.

Yet the June 2015 battle for Ma’sara Checkpoint was not the first attempt at dislodging the regime. Three years earlier, Free Syrian Army fighters waged a month-long battle for the fate of their town. Ultimately unsuccessful, the First Battle of Muhambal serves as a clear example of the opposition’s structural weaknesses in Idlib during this period.

Tanks gathering at the Ma’sara Checkpoint in early October, 2012, one month before the first battle for Muhambal.

Returning Home

Major Bassem al-Youssef was serving as a battalion commander in the 100th Artillery Regiment when the revolution began. For three months his hometown of Muhambal held regular protests against the regime. Muhambal is The A subdistrict administrative seat, Muhambal connects northwest Hama with southwest Idlib. The city itself sits on the edge of the Jabal Zawiyah mountain range, looking north over the outstretched Rouj Plain. Known as “the Princess of al-Rouj”, Muhambal serves as the bridge between these two regions, its residents tracing their heritage to villages in both Jabal Zawiyah and al-Rouj.

Residents from across the Muhambal Subdistrict would travel to the town for large, joint demonstrations against the regime. The town’s police station remained uninvolved during these first months, according to one resident, and the protests continued in peace. In June 2011, demonstrators received word the regime was sending a small shipment of assault rifles to the station. Protestors stormed the station and seized the rifles. Revolutionary leaders in the town then organized transportation for the police officers to return to their hometowns. Muhambal was liberated.

That same month, demonstrators and armed opposition fighters, inflamed by a series of escalating violations, stormed the Military Intelligence headquarters in the nearby city of Jisr Shoughur. According to an August 2011 United Nations Fact-Finding Mission report, on April 30 security forces had conducted a mass arrest of some 40 civilians in the city, releasing them three days later following demonstrations. All showed signs of torture. On June 4, locals organized a funeral of a murdered protestor. According to the UN, 14 civilians were killed during the demonstration, including Hassan Malesh, who was shot by snipers while giving a speech. The next day, a mix of armed locals and opposition fighters stormed the city’s intelligence headquarters, killing all 120 security members.

The regime responding by militarizing its anti-protest campaign in Idlib. A half dozen special forces regiments and regular army brigades were deployed to Idlib over the next month, establishing bases and a dense network of checkpoints across the governorate. Major Bassem’s battalion was among those newly deployed, tasked with establishing a new base on the outskirts of Muhambal.

Regime forces stationed at the newly established Ma’sara and Irshadiyah Checkpoints began to heavily target demonstrators two months later, according to one resident. Locals formed loose armed networks to protect the protests and target the checkpoint in retaliation, but they were unable to end the violence, and many residents fled the town for the countryside.

Major Bassem was desperate to defect, but was transferred out of his unit shortly after arriving in Muhambal and sent to a brigade in Baniyas. One of his brothers was also serving in the army at the time; for either to defect required careful planning in order to avoid the other facing regime retribution. In the early fall of 2011 Bassem was able to use a short vacation pass and his brother’s smuggled ID card to defect join his family back in Muhambal. He quickly set out organizing the weak armed networks into a unified group, and two months later announced the official formation of the Martyrs of Muhambal Battalion (KSM) in November 2011. Under Bassem’s leadership, the battalion gradually expanded its operations against Ma’sara and began to coordinate with other newly established FSA battalions in the region.

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Prelude to Battle

Shortly after Major Bassem’s defection, Colonel Ahmed al-Ali defected from the regime and returned to his home in the nearby town of Bsheiriyeh. Al-Ali announced the establishment of Liwa Ahrar Jabal Wastani in March 2012, brining together the local battalions of the villages in the Sahel al-Rouj and adjacent Wastani Mountains. His group quickly became a close ally of the Muhambal Martyrs Battalion.

On October 7, 2012, the revolutionary factions of the Sahel al-Rouj and Jabal Wastani launched their first serious offensive against the regime. Within 24 hours they killed Colonel Karam Mustafa, senior regime officer from the 3rd Division overseeing operations in the area. Over the next three weeks, regime checkpoints across the northwest Rouj Plain and Jabal Wastani were destroyed. On October 16 the town of Azmarin was liberated, followed two days later by Darkush. The Martyrs of Muhambal Battalion participated in all of these battles.

“This was the first battle where we all agreed to work together on a single objective, because without this we could not move,” one former KSM fighter explains to me in a meeting in Muhambal this summer. The entire Rouj Plain was locked down by the Ma’sara Checkpoint and a second base atop the Wastani mountain range, al-Zaher Checkpoint. Revolutionary fighters were forced to travel by motorcycle on small dirt roads, often at night, as long as the regime held both these positions.

Despite the intimidating mountain-top position of the Zaher Checkpoint, the battle itself was small. The opposition was able to surround the checkpoint and secure the defection of almost the entire garrison – 25 soldiers and a colonel. Some of the defectors then joined the fight, while others were smuggled home. Despite inter-faction coordination still being very weak, the offensive was a resounding success. Supply lines were now open from the Turkish border to Muhambal. “These battles were the opening gate to the November battle for the Ma’sara checkpoint,” the former fighter tells me.

The First Battle for Muhambal

By November 2012, most of the civilians in Muhambal had already been displaced. Regime forces inside al-Ma’sara and from the nearby Jurin base, in the al-Ghab Plain, used artillery and mortars to strike civilian homes in response to clashes in the wider area. By early 2012 regime helicopters had begun dropping barrel bombs on the town as well. Soldiers also regularly shot at and killed civilians – men and women – passing along the main road between Muhambal and the highway.

The regime had also successfully mobilized local shabiha inside Muhambal. These men and women, usually coming from the hardcore Baathist families or the town’s petty criminals, were primarily used to report on opposition activity. According to one resident, there were around 15 informants feeding intelligence officers in al-Ma’sara with the names and homes of opposition figures. This information was used to direct targeted shelling of homes and, at times, safehouses used by the Martyrs of Muhambal Battalion. At the same time, around a half dozen defectors had been secured from the checkpoint throughout 2012, each one providing information about the strength and deployment of regime forces inside.

With the northern axis now secured, Major Bassem prepared for a new battle to liberate his town. Muhambal’s familial and cultural links to the villages of Jabal Zawiya eased coordination with other nearby FSA battalions to some degree. The battalions loosely organized under Liwa Ahrar Wastani and local factions from Jabal Zawiya agreed to support the Martyrs of Muhambal Battalion. Calls were made to mobilize inside the town on November 1, and a last line of retreat into Jabal Zawiyah via the Bsamas road was agreed upon. Yet all coordination at this time was through walkie talkies. Unsecure communication lines and the presence of informants in the towns enabled regime forces to learn about these plans and the impending attack.

Fighters from Jabal Zawiyah enter Muhambal from the Bsamas road to support the operation, November 1, 2012.

Most of the groups involved in the battle were small FSA units with limited supplies. KSM itself only had one light machine gun, for example, and was stretched thin on ammunition. Bassem’s brother, Ihsan, who at the time served as the battalion’s logistics officer, made a supply run during the battle. Ihsan had has to drive a motorcycle from Muhambal to an FSA base 50 miles north in Atmeh, where he picked up a few guns and boxes of machine gun ammo. It was only enough to last the group ten more days.

Crucially, a few more powerful groups also joined the fight. Suqour al-Sham, originally from eastern Jabal Zawiyah but increasingly participating in battles across the governorate, operated at least one unit with IED experience on the western axis, tasked with cutting off reinforcements from Jisr Shoughur. A battalion from Liwa Tahweed – by now a rapidly growing armed faction with affiliates across Idlib and Aleppo – also joined, and brought with them trucks, machine guns, and plenty of ammunition.

On November 1, 2012, a group of KSM fighters gathered in the upper neighborhood, in an area known as Qarat, a hundred meters above the Irshadiyah Checkpoint. The attack began with an assault on Irshadiya – a school-turned-base on the edge of town. The checkpoint was quickly captured during the opening assault, with the soldiers inside either killed or withdrawing to Ma’sara. Opposition fighters then closed in around al-Ma’sara, readying for the final push. Then regime jets arrived.

Martyrs of Muhambal Battalion gathering in the Qarat Square, just above the Irshadiyah Checkpoint, on November 1, 2012.

The assault soon stalled. “We had many battalions from the area participating with us,” a former fighter tells me, “but there was no strong coordination between us, there was little trust and experience in conducting a complex battle.” The earlier operations in the Rouj Plain and Jabal Wastani had only involved light clashes, with most regime fighters either surrendering or running away. True tactical coordination between units was not a reality yet. Instead, different factions would agree to hold different areas - from there they largely fought on their own. This was the first true battle for many of these men, and the rapid intervention by regime airpower quickly threw them into disarray. After a day or two of enduring heavy airstrikes, Major Bassem gathered the remaining civilians in the town and begged them to leave.

Over the next week, regime forces sent convoys every day to the battle. These were heavily armed reinforcements, each convoy consisting of multiple tanks and BMPs, arriving from both Jisr Shoughur in the west and Ariha in the east. Opposition fighters had expanded the frontline beyond the town itself, where KSM was the main force, and were trying to assault Ma’sara from multiple directions as well as cut the highway and besiege the checkpoint. Suqour al-Sham’s Nour al-Islam Battalion had been conducting IED operations in and around the northern Sahel al-Ghab area for several months already. As the Muhambal battle began, this unit established a position near the village of Sallat al-Zahour, along the international highway, and started ambushing small convoys moving in from Jisr Shoughur.

Opposition fighters attempt to stop a large armor column from entering al-Ma’sara Checkpoint from Ariha on November 3, 2012. Source.

On November 3, regime reinforcements consisting of four tanks, one BMP and several improvised troop carriers pushed towards the town from Ariha. Opposition units stationed along the highway ambushed part of the convoy, destroying one tank, but the remaining forces made it to Ma’sara.

A regime convoy enters the Ma’sara Checkpoint from the highway as opposition fighters strike part of the base, November 3, 2012.

The Suqour al-Sham fighters in the Sallat al-Zahour area likewise continued IED strikes against reinforcements moving from Jisr Shoughur, successfully successfully destroying and capturing several tanks and BMPs over the ensuing days. At the same time, armor columns from inside Ma’sara pushed west along the highway trying to dislodge the opposition forces operating out of the small ubran clusters north and south of the highway.

An armored column moved west from Ma’sara, firing on houses just south of the highway before a massive IED is detonated just in front of the advancing tanks, November 4, 2011.

Fierce clashes continued through November 6, when opposition fighters managed to knock out five vehicles arriving on the edge of the city from Ariha. This ambush seemed to have largely secured the town’s eastern approach under opposition control. On November 9, an engineering battalion rigged the Nahal Bridge on this axis with explosives, heavily damaging the road. With regime advances from Ariha now stunted, fighters repositioned from the highway back into the city, pushing up to the edge of the Ma’sara checkpoint.

An engineering unit of the FSA’s Liwa al-Qasas lays improvised charges on the Nahal Bridge, nearly cutting the bridge entirely.

However, that same day, new regime reinforcements moved in from Jisr Shoughur, this time storming the villages along the highway where Suqour al-Sham and other factions had staged ambushes. Regime forces set fire to homes Sallat al-Zahour and Mintar as nearly a dozen tanks slowly advanced to Ma’sara. Regime warplanes stepped up their bombing runs too. The eastern axis, coming from Ariha, was under solid opposition control following the bridge bombing. Local forces were able to ambush regime support units as they were forced to slow down and navigate the broken bridge. But the combination of heavy airstrikes and endless columns of tanks coming down the open highway from Jisr Shoughur proved too much for the opposition to overcome.

Regime forces storming Sallat al-Zahour and Mintar villages on November 11, 2012. The villages would remain under assault through the next day.

The ferocity of the fighting eased and the frontline stabilized. Clashes continued through the end of the month, but neither side made any serious progress. At some point, a faction from eastern Idlib called Liwa Dawoud arrived with a car bomb. They intended to detonate the Old Idlib Highway Bridge, an overpass connecting a highway exit between Muhambal and Ariha with Muhambal, further limiting the regime’s ability to advance from the east. However, this road is extremely rugged and steep and was at the time only being used by local fighters and civilians to move out of the town. KSM leaders urged them to instead wait and use the car bomb on a regime convoy. Liwa Dawoud ignored this advice and detonated the bomb underneath the bridge, which remains destroyed to this day.

Many opposition units had withdrawn from the battle by late November. Ammunition shortages, especially among the smaller FSA battalions, was a major factor, but many had also lost hope in the battle and chose to return to their home areas. Seeing their support dwindling, Major Bassem made a final commitment to the town: “I will not leave Muhambal except as a martyr,” Ihsan remembers him saying.

On December 1, 2012, Major Bassem attempted one last assault on al-Ma’sara. He assigned a faction from a nearby town to hold the Qarat area – the same hilltop neighborhood from which they had first assaulted Irshadiyah – while KSM fighters advanced to the edge of Ma’sara. Qarat was a critical point, securing the high ground from regime forces. Yet instead of holding it, some members of the faction looted the abandoned civilian homes and withdrew. Regime forces inside Ma’sara realized Qarat had been abandoned and sent a unit through the edge of the town to take over the position. Heavy fire suddenly hit the KSM fighters from above. Unsure where this fire was coming from, Bassem ordered a retreat. Men moved along the pre-established roads into Jabal Zawiyah – including through the valley directly beneath Qarat. As Major Bassem carried a wounded fighter up the valley, regime soldiers called to him. Thinking they were from the allied battalion, Bassem and the wounded fighter moved towards them. The soldiers opened fire, killing both men.

Aftermath

The battle was over, and Muhambal was fully under regime control. The remaining fighters withdrew via the next valley, unable to recover Major Bassem al-Youssef’s body. He would lay under the olive grove in that valley for three more years. Ihsan had been wounded earlier in the battle and was in Turkey receiving treatment when his brother was killed. It was not until June 6, 2015 that the combined forces of Idlib’s opposition factions finally captured al-Ma’sara and liberated the town. Ihsan and his father immediately searched for Bassem’s body and gave him a proper burial. Their father passed away shortly after from a heart attack.

The Muhambal Martyrs Battalion had dissolved by 2014. Some of its former members blame the Free Syrian Army leadership in Turkey for never truly supporting them or the other local FSA battalions. But the revolutionaries of Muhambal did not disappear. Fighters from the town joined other more powerful groups like the Free Idlib Army, Ahrar al-Sham, and Jabhat al-Nusra. ‘Martyrdom’ commemorations for Muhambal fighters can be easily found through the fall of Assad. Many locals continued to be martyred after the liberation, killed by ex-regime insurgents while serving as General Security personnel in Syria’s coast in March 2025.

Civilians continued to be killed in the months after the first battle, as some people gambled with life in their homes rather than the tent camps along Turkey’s border. Regime forces in Ma’sara shot passerby’s with rifles and tank shells, women and men, and continued to indiscriminately shell the Idlib countryside for three years. One of the officers in charge of the checkpoint was a Sunni from a village close to Muhambal. All but his most immediate family had joined the revolution, and, according to one of his cousins, he seemed to inflict a personal revenge on the villages in the area. Officials today estimate the town of less than 20,000 lost around 600 people during the war.

The battle’s failure highlighted a key shortcoming of the opposition in Idlib during this period. As isolated and weak regime outposts were captured in the countryside, regime forces increasingly strengthened critical hardpoints along the major roads. The chaotic, unorganized “coordination” that worked against the smaller checkpoints stood no chance against heavily defended positions that could be easily supported by columns of armor and frequent airstrikes. This lesson would portend the stagnation of the Idlib frontline seen throughout much of 2013, only reversed when the factions finally united into the first large operations rooms at the end of the year.

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One of these towns is Mushrefa, just east of Talbiseh. Mushrefa is an originally Christian town which, through the demographic engineering policies of Hafez al-Assad, saw an influx of Alawi and Sunni residents during the second half of the 20^th Century. Mushrefa sat on the frontline of the war for six years. A large checkpoint on the town’s western entrance marked the border with the opposition, and a military base on its northern edge was used to frequently shell opposition towns.

Given the long history of fighting and the diverse nature of the area, one might assume that Mushrefa would fall victim to intercommunal and vigilante violence. Yet the town has largely been peaceful and the old inter-communal ties between Talbiseh and Mushrefa have returned. Many residents credit the actions of the town’s mayor, Mrs. Eileen As-Sit, with easing the entrance of HTS-affiliation forces into Mushrefa in December 2024 and maintaining peace in the town since.

I visited Mushrefa early this year and met with one of the Christian influencers in the town to learn more about the post-Assad transition there. I recently returned and met with Mrs. As-Sit. Earlier this summer, Eileen worked with a civil activist from Talbiseh and with the Homs government to host the country’s first Peace Festival (since replicated across the country), highlighting the different cultures of the communities in northern Homs. Below is a partial transcript of our interview, discussing how she engaged with the first opposition factions to enter the town on December 6, 2024, her social cohesion work in the two years since, and the current situation for Christians.

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• Aleppo and Idlib

• Damascus

• Coast

• Homs

• Hama

This week saw four notable security-related events across central and western Syria. Early in the week, two Alawi men were killed and two wounded in three shootings in western Hama. Western Hama remains the most violent area of western Syria, and while also receiving the least INGO support for social cohesion initiatives. Meanwhile, the heightened arrest campaign of regime era officers that began last week continued this week. At least eight operations were announced this week, resulting in the arrest of dozens of regime-era officers including nine senior pilots. Lebanese authorities also arrested the infamous regime criminal Suleiman Assad and extradition talks are reportedly underway.

Two bouts of civil unrest arose late this week. First, in northeast Syria, an Arab local executed a recently-integrated ex-SDF soldier, triggering protests and riots in Kobani. The killing was widely reported in local Arab media as a revenge act for earlier killings committed by the SDF member. On Sunday, the Syrian government announced a significant increase in fuel prices due to the ongoing U.S.-Iran war’s impact on international fuel prices and access. This surge triggered protests in Hasakah and Raqqa in the afternoon, followed by protests across towns in Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, and northern Homs in the evening.

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I have covered the sectarian- and revenge-linked dynamics in Sahel al-Ghab several times here, based on weeks of meetings with residents over the course of the past year. The most severe tensions originate from the string of Sunni, Alawi, and Murshdi villages in the center of al-Ghab Plain, known as the “Middle Line.” The Sunni homes here were systematically dismantled by local regime militias following their complete displacement in 2015. The severity of this crime and today’s lack of housing or infrastructure, is the single most important factor fueling violence in the area. Every person I have met with this summer, from every sect, has agreed that the only way to end the violence is to rebuild the five Sunni villages.

Earlier this year I published an interview with a resident of one of these destroyed villages, Ramleh. Last month I met with several residents of another village, Qabr Fida. Below is a partial transcript of that meeting, covering the history of the town before displacement, challenges after returning, and inter-faith relations.

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• Aleppo and Idlib

• Damascus

• Coast

• Homs

• Hama

This week saw major arrest campaigns against regime era criminals across the country. In a continuation of a months-long trend since the start of summer, the operations targeted senior regime officers and Sunni militia members. At least nine different operations were conducted in Aleppo, Hama, Latakia, and Damascus resulting in dozens of men being arrested.

There was little violence this week. A Shia man was killed in western Homs while guarding farming equipment and two Sunni men were killed in Hama City in apparent revenge or dispute-driven killings. Meanwhile, security forces conducted arrests across the country against men accused of murder, drug trafficking, theft, and impersonation of security forces.

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Significant trust-building efforts had been made throughout late 2025, but these collapsed earlier this spring with the appointment of a new security official. I covered this dynamic extensively in my May interview transcript from meetings with several local community leaders. Late last month I returned to Beit Yashout to assess how the situation had changed. Below is a partial interview transcript with several community influencers detailing the positive impact of the tourism season (mirroring what I have heard across other parts of the coast), the current security situation, and how the local community has responded to transitional justice-linked arrest campaigns.

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• Aleppo and Idlib

• Damascus

• Coast

• Homs

• Hama

This week saw several developments on the transitional justice file. Three court rulings for regime-era officials were handed down, including two death sentences. In the coast, two former regime generals were arrested, continuing a recent shift towards targeting only senior regime officers rather than lower-level men. A regime officer-turned insurgent commander was also killed during an arrest operation at the end of the week.

The most serious violence this week came in the southern Damascus suburb of Jdeidat Artouz. Displaced Deiri residents living in the neighborhood rioted and attacked Damascene residents on two occasions following reports that a Damascene man had assaulted two Deiris. Military Police were deployed alongside Internal Security Forces and tribal leaders were called on to maintain calm. Also this week, a man was arrested for last week’s killing of a Christian man in Homs City. The detainee claimed he killed the Christian man for trying to rape his niece in 2012.

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Two such villages sit just a few kilometers west of the city of Homs. Qizhal and Umm Qassab are both Ottoman-era Turkmen villages built on low rises in a rocky plain covered in wheat fields. To their northwest lies the Houla Plains, the Sunni Arab villages which suffered brutal sectarian massacres in May 2012. To their west are a string of mostly Alawi villages from which Assad-loyalist militias emerged in 2011.

Like the other coastal Turkmen villages of Mitras and az-Zara, Qizhal and Um Qassab suffered under a multi-year siege and eventual violent displacement by regime forces during the war. The two villages are isolated, too far from their neighboring revolutionary towns and too small and exposed to have any large armed movement of their own. Their story is a microcosm of the systematic sectarian violence employed by the Assad regime across much of Syria, the consequences of which are still being felt two years after the country’s liberation. Yet their post-war reconciliation experiences also offer hope for the country’s future.

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From Protests to Siege

I recently visited Qizhal to learn about its experiences during the Syrian revolution. The village historically relies on farming, with most residents alternating seasonal crops like wheat and vegetables. Before the war, around 40% of the town worked as either civil service or military employees in the regime, according to both locals and the regime’s 2004 census. When the revolution began, nearly all of these government employees defected or quit their jobs.

At first, the residents of Qizhal joined the protests in Homs City. But the regime quickly established checkpoints on the city’s outskirts, and traveling through the open fields and along the highway became too dangerous. Qizhal’s protestors then moved north, traveling weekly to Houla to participate in the demonstrations in Taldou’s main square. This pattern continued through the spring of 2011. Around July, regime intelligence units established a new string of checkpoints between Qizhal and Houla and began to violently crack down on the demonstrations. Residents were protesting on a near daily basis, but were often forced to demonstrate in side streets and quickly disperse when soldiers began to shoot at them.

In February 2012, the regime launched a massive military operation against a dozen opposition-held neighborhoods in Homs city. The neighborhood of al-Waer, separated from the rest of the city by the Orontes River and a wide swathe of farmland, remain cut-off from the other opposition neighborhoods. Together, al-Waer, Qizhal, and Umm Qassab formed one pocket increasingly under siege.

By 2013, it had become impossible to reach Houla, but movement between the other three communities continued, though only ever at night. In 2014 the regime cut the eastern side of Qizhal, establishing new checkpoints along an old railroad track running between Qizhal and al-Waer. To the west, the countryside had become a hotbed of regime militias, mostly units of the National Defense Forces (NDF) operating under the infamous criminal Shujaa al-Ali. Rebel forces in Houla and northern Homs made several attempts to break the siege, but the area was too exposed and the villages too weak.

At this point the humanitarian situation became dire. The militias and checkpoints suffocated the two villages and the regime blocked most aid from entering. Farmers were no longer able to work the land outside the villages’ immediate vicinity or risk being shot – four farmers were killed this way, their bodies never recovered. Dozens of people were kidnapped by NDF members while trying to pass the checkpoints; some returned after paying large ransoms but most remain missing to this day.

Throughout the first years of the revolution anyone found with an ID card reading “Qizhal” was in danger of being killed. Government employees and university students studying in the city soon abandoned their jobs and school as traveling through regime checkpoints each day became a gamble with death. Still, many were captured and more than 45 residents have been documented as executed in regime prisons during these first years. Nearly all of Qizhal’s men serving in the regime’s army defected as well, though most went to other places to join armed groups, leaving few experienced fighters to defend the village.

Left with only a small force to defend their town, Qizhal stood little chance when the regime made a final push to force the area’s “reconciliation".”

Surrender and Betrayal

The reconciliation process was led by the regime’s National Reconciliation Committee, headed by Minister Ali Haider. This committee had for years been involved in imposed reconciliations on oppositions towns across rural Damascus and Homs. On October 11, 2015, a delegation led by Ali Haider, Homs Governor Talal Barazi, and Homs Police Chief Akram Basou met with community leaders in Qizhal and Umm Qasseb. According to regime reporting at the time, 95 armed men from the two villages agreed to lay down their weapons. Locals say, however, that the regime demanded weapons which they did not have, forcing them to buy 15 rifles from regime units and then hand them over. The regime then brought in additional guns for a photoshoot to announce the reconciliation’s completion.

Yet nothing changed afterwards. The checkpoints remained in place and the villages remained empty of regime forces. For nine months a tense truce held. The people of Qizhal still could not leave their besieged area, but the regime had not taken full control.

Then, on July 14, 2016, regime forces backed by local militias from western Homs raided Qizhal and detained three men. According to a report by al-Arabiya, residents of Qizhal tried to defend their village from the raid. Two locals were killed but they managed to capture a group of regime fighters. The regime quickly moved from siege to assault, bringing in tanks and artillery and initiating two days of heavy strikes on the villages. Many women and children first fled to Umm Qassab, which was under less severe strikes, taking shelter in the main school. Yet regime forces soon hit the school with rockets as well, killing four children. On July 16, Qizhal and Umm Qasab surrendered.

A second high-level regime delegation visited the village and agreed to open a corridor to the besieged opposition pocket in northern Homs and exchange all prisoners between the two sides. On July 17, nearly the entire population of both towns – more than 6,500 people – walked to Dar al-Kabira where they were then bussed to Rastan. All 33 regime detainees were exchanged for 22 residents who had been kidnapped by regime military and NDF forces over the years, as well as the body of one kidnapped man who had been killed under torture.

The survivors of the siege of Qizhal would spend the next two years living under a new siege in northern Homs. On April 29, 2018, regime forces unleashed a massive bombing campaign on the Rastan pocket, launching more than 500 artillery shells and 70 airstrikes in just 24 hours, according to Syria Direct. On May 2, opposition leaders surrendered. Five days later, regime buses took thousands of fighters and their families to northern Syria. The residents of Qizhal were displaced a second time, with most arriving in Afrin.

A handful of families had returned to Qizhal a few weeks after their first displacement in July 2016, believing that they would be safe from regime retribution. However, according to locals, several residents were quickly detained and for two years the returnees lived under the thumb of intelligence and police units who had turned the town center into a detention center. Regime militias, mostly linked to Shujaa al-Ali, also engaged in widespread looting as soon as the villages were depopulated. Farm equipment, livestock, and everything left in homes was stolen and either brought to the Alawi and Shia villages to the west or sold in markets.

Return and Reconciliation

From 2018 until 2024, the residents of Qizhal and Umm Qassab spread out across the region. Most were displaced to Afrin, but many others found themselves in Turkey, Lebanon, or Europe. When the Assad regime fell in December 2024, they were finally able to return home. Most residents returned throughout 2025 – only around 1,000 are estimated to still be in the camps or outside Syria. Returning was just the first step, however. The residents of Qizhal now had to rebuild their lives and grapple with the years of crimes and violence that often came from their neighbors.

During the siege, it was the NDF factions emerging from several nearby Alawi villages which caused the greatest damage; kidnappings, killing farmers, extortion, and later looting homes. All of these crimes fueled deep hatred and anger between communities which had for generations lived alongside each other. Most of these regime networks fell under the command of Shujaa Ali. His network, which included both militia leaders and local intelligence and army officers, established several unofficial prisons inside their villages.

Shujaa Ali and many of his most hardcore followers were killed in a large security operation on December 27, 2024. According to community leaders in Qizhal, most of the remaining top leadership of Shujaa’s network and other NDF factions in the area fled to Lebanon that month. This left only some rank-and-file NDF members in these villages. Qizhal’s farmland, which had been worked by nearby Alawis in the years after the village’s displacement, was abandoned as well, preventing any post-war disputes over land rights.

With the worst NDF criminals gone and a few others detained, disputes settled on property theft and financial compensation. “Those small criminals were looting our homes due to their own poverty,” one man in Qizhal explained. Some residents were able to identify specific thieves from pictures on Facebook showing their tractors or farm equipment. They then entered into personal or legal negotiations for at least partial compensation. Others have filed cases in the courts. Still, most residents never learned who exactly looted their homes.

A combination of official and unofficial actors engaged in reconciliation dialogues between Qizhal and neighboring towns throughout 2025. A local branch of the Homs Reconciliation Council hosted several meetings, while Qizhal’s mukhtar personally hosted nine dialogue sessions with the Alawi village of Tanoula. All of the violations had been committed by only a few hundred NDF members - a small percentage of the thousands of Alawi residents living nearby. Emphasis was placed on understanding that not everyone from those communities was with the regime.

According to residents of Qizhal, relations between themselves and the Alawi communities have improved greatly over the past one and a half years. At first, Alawi farmers were too scared of reprisals to work their own land, and most residents stayed in their villages out of fear. Gradually, through dialogues and a lack of revenge violence, life returned to normal. Today, families in Qizhal hire their Alawi neighbors as farm labor or to help with reconstruction and there is regular movement between the villages.

Shadowed by the sheer numbers of victims from their Sunni neighbors, places like Qizhal, Umm Qassab, az-Zara, and Mitras represent scores of smaller villages across the country which suffered under the regime and its militias far from media headlines. Their experiences in inter-communal reconciliation after liberation were equally absent from the media, but highlight the successful role local mediation has played in dampening the scale of intercommunal violence post-Assad. These histories should serve as a warning for the scale of civil peace challenges in Syria today, but also as models for reconciliation which can be brought to other communities.

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There are two major towns on the coast between Lebanon and Tartous, al-Mintar and Hamadiyah. I recently visited al-Mintar to learn more about its history and the experiences of inter-sect relations during and after the revolution. Following is an overview of the town based on those interviews.

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• Aleppo and Idlib

• Damascus

• Coast

• Homs

• Hama

This week saw three killings across Hama governorate, which has witnessed the most sustained violence in Syria in recent months. A second murder in just 48 hours in the al-Ghab plains came at the start of the week, linked to ongoing housing disputes and seizures. Two vigilante killings occurred later in northern and eastern Hama. As usual, any vigilante killings of Alawis are widely circulated on social media with the victims portrayed as civilians.

Suspected ISIS attacks also continued this week, including a rare IED attack near Damascus’ al-Tal. This same area has seen infrequent kidnappings and executions of Alawi taxi drivers, potentially linking ISIS cells to those past killings.

This week also marked the official dissolution of the SDF. As a result, the ISC formally entered Kobani and deployed new vehicles and uniforms for an array of departments. These departments appear to be mostly or fully staffed by former Asayish members.

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However, it is always difficult to know if, as a foreigner or even just an outsider, you are being told the whole truth when visiting sensitive areas. Recently, a friend of mine who lives abroad but grew up in Talkalakh before the war visited his family’s home for the first time since Assad’s fall. He spend several weeks this summer meeting with Alawi friends and family in the city and countryside, not as a journalist or researcher but as a member of the community. Below is a transcript of a phone call the two of us had after his visit, recounting some of the key takeaways he had from his first time in post-Assad Syria as well as a detailed analysis of the challenge of economic recovery.

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• Aleppo and Idlib

• Damascus

• Coast

• Homs

• Hama

Killings continue to occur across the country, targeting men from every sect over a range of motivations including land disputes and sectarian killings. At least four men were murdered this week under such motivations in Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, while other theft-related murders also occurred. This week also saw sharp social media outcry over the death of a Civil Defense volunteer in Latakia following his beating by police officers inside the Haffeh Police Jail.

Ministry of Interior units continue to arrest criminal gangs involved in theft and kidnappings. ISC units also responded to protests in Kobani early this week following attacks on Kurdish IDP convoys in Hasakah’s Ras al-Ain. The Ministry also announced that 6 of the men arrested in Quneitra last week on charges of belonging to ISIS were to be released after it was determined they had no affiliations with the organization.

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إحدى غرف مبنى حكومي قديم وسط معبد بيل الأثري تحمل لافتة كُتب عليها “مقر القناصة“. وفي الداخل، تزين الجدران شعارات وأسماء تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية. وفي الطابق العلوي، توجد غرفة تحمل اسم إحدى قوات المخابرات التابعة للأسد، “وحدة مكافحة الإرهاب“. وتحيط بها آيات دينية وشعارات ميليشيات شيعية من العراق ولبنان. وإلى الشرق، يقع مجمع فندقي كان يومًا ما فخمًا، وقد تحول إلى أطلال. ومع ذلك، بالكاد تلاشت على جدرانه شعارات كبيرة مرسومة بعناية باللغة الفارسية تُخلّد ذكرى فرقة الفاطميون الأفغانية. وإلى الشمال مباشرة من الآثار القديمة، على مشارف مدينة تدمر، تتجمع سبعة أكوام من الخرسانة الملتوية وقضبان التسليح معًا - وهي بقايا غارة جوية إسرائيلية على مقر إيراني في الأيام الأخيرة لنظام الأسد.

حاول الأسد، ثم داعش، وإيران، وروسيا، والجهاديون الشيعة من الخارج، جميعهم حكم هذه المدينة العريقة. والآن، رحلوا. لسنوات، كانت تدمر أشبه بنعش مهدم، فقد نزح سكانها بالكامل تقريبًا، ودُمّرت منازلهم ومدارسهم ومساجدهم وكنائسهم ونُهبت، وحُوّلت المباني المتبقية إلى ثكنات عسكرية. عندما سقط النظام في 8 ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2024، بدأ سكان تدمر والمناطق المحيطة بها بالعودة. وسرعان ما شكّلوا هيئة إدارية محلية جديدة، وبدأوا في إعادة بناء مدينتهم، حتى في الوقت الذي كانت فيه الدولة السورية الجديدة لا تزال في طور التكوين.

كانت تدمر، ولا تزال، المركز الإداري والاقتصادي للبادية السورية، وهي منطقة شاسعة من السهوب والصحاري ومجاري الأنهار الجافة والجبال الوعرة الممتدة بين دمشق ونهر الفرات. تربط مئات الأميال من الطرق المعبدة وغير المعبدة مدن البادية المتباعدة ببعضها. يضم قضاء تدمر تسع مدن وعشرات القرى، الرسمية وغير الرسمية. يعيش التجار والمزارعون الحضريون جنباً إلى جنب مع القبائل البدوية الرحل. وسط الدمار الهائل الذي اجتاح سوريا، كاد أهل تدمر أن يُنسوا، لكنهم بدأوا بإعادة بناء مدينتهم العريقة.

إعادة الخدمات الأساسية

بعد أربعة عشر عامًا من الحرب وعقود من الإهمال، أُلقيت مسؤولية إعادة بناء هذه المساحة الشاسعة من المجتمعات المترابطة على عاتق عدد قليل من السكان المحليين الذين يعانون من نقص الدعم. كان ساهر الصغير من أوائل العائدين إلى تدمر من مخيمات اللاجئين في شمال سوريا بعد سقوط النظام. وسرعان ما شرع في تنظيم إدارة محلية أساسية؛ فجمع التبرعات وأعاد تقديم الخدمات الأساسية، وحلّ النزاعات، ودعم العائلات العائدة إلى منازلها المدمرة. وسرعان ما التفّ المجتمع حوله، وفي أغسطس/آب 2025 عُيّن رسميًا مديرًا لمحافظة تدمر. وقال لي أحد النشطاء المحليين: “يعمل ساهر مع أي شخص يستطيع مساعدة أهالي تدمر، فهو لا يهتم إلا بخدمة هذه المناطق”.

لكنّه وفريقه يواجهون تحديًا هائلًا. يقول ساهر لي في مكتبه مطلع هذا الربيع: “كانت مدينة تدمر منطقة عسكرية حتى نهاية الحرب. دُمّرت المدينة تدميرًا كاملًا، ولم يبقَ فيها سوى عدد قليل جدًا من السكان”. تقاسم الروس والإيرانيون والأفغان والعراقيون وقوات النظام السوري السيطرة على المباني المتبقية، وأنشأت كلٌّ منها قواعد صغيرة. زرعت هذه القوات مئات الآلاف من الألغام الأرضية في أنحاء المدينة وريفها، مستخدمةً خرائطها وخططها الخاصة، دون وجود قاعدة بيانات مركزية. منذ التحرير، أزال مهندسون من الجيش السوري الجديد، وعناصر الدفاع المدني، فضلًا عن السكان المحليين في مبادرات خاصة، 50 ألف لغم من قضاء تدمر. قُتل ثلاثون مهندسًا من الجيش والدفاع المدني خلال هذه العملية، بينما لقي أكثر من مئة مدني حتفهم بسبب الألغام هنا في غضون عام ونصف فقط.

على مدى عقدٍ تقريبًا، كانت تدمر خط المواجهة في حرب الصحراء بين تنظيم داعش والنظام السوري. تبادلت السيطرة على المدينة نفسها عدة مرات قبل أن تسيطر عليها قوات النظام نهائيًا عام ٢٠١٧، بينما ظل الريف محل نزاع حتى سقوط النظام. ونتيجةً لذلك، تعرضت المدينة بأكملها لقصف جوي ومدفعي متكرر. دُمرت البنية التحتية تدميرًا كاملًا، وأصبحت المدارس والمستشفيات أطلالًا، واحترقت واحة الواحة التاريخية الكبيرة الواقعة خارج المدينة. ويُقدّر مسؤولون محليون أن ٢٠٪ من المدينة دُمرت بالكامل بحلول ديسمبر ٢٠٢٤، بينما نُهبت بقية المباني وتعرضت لأضرار جزئية على الأقل تتطلب إعادة بناء قبل السماح بسكنها.

قادت الجهود المبذولة لإعادة الإعمار هذه بشكل شبه كامل من قبل السكان المحليين. عاد نحو 50 ألف شخص، أي ثلث سكان المدينة، من مخيمات النزوح في شمال سوريا. لكن مغادرة المخيمات تعني التخلي عن الخدمات الأساسية كالرعاية الصحية والكهرباء والمدارس والمياه. لم تكن أي من هذه الخدمات متوفرة في تدمر عند سقوط النظام. وقد عمل ساهر وفريقه الصغير من المديرين المتفانين بلا كلل لتغيير هذا الواقع.

شهدت البنية التحتية الأساسية في مدينة تدمر تحسناً تدريجياً على مدار عام 2025، إلا أنها لا تزال محدودة للغاية وضعيفة. فقد نُهبت جميع المعدات الطبية من قبل النظام، وبينما قام العائدون بترميم المستشفى وشراء معدات جديدة، إلا أنهم يواجهون نقصاً حاداً في الكوادر الطبية. فمستشفى تدمر، الذي يخدم المدينة وكل قرية في منطقة تدمر التي تبلغ مساحتها 30 ألف كيلومتر مربع، لا يضم سوى طبيب واحد وعدد قليل من الممرضات. وقد حالت الرواتب المنخفضة، والرحلة الشاقة التي تستغرق ساعات طويلة من مدينة حمص، ونقص المساكن، دون عمل أطباء آخرين في المدينة. وإلى جانب المشاكل الطبية الاعتيادية، يتعين على هذا الطبيب وطاقمه الصغير التعامل مع إصابات الألغام وحوادث المرور الخطيرة الناجمة عن الطرق المتضررة بشدة. وأي إصابة خطيرة تتطلب رعاية متخصصة تعني السفر لأكثر من ساعتين إلى مدينة حمص، بل وأكثر من ذلك إذا كانوا يسكنون في إحدى المدن الأخرى في منطقة تدمر.

لا يقتصر نقص الموظفين في تدمر على قسم الخدمات الطبية فقط. فقبل الحرب، كان قسم كهرباء مقاطعة تدمر يضم 80 عاملاً يخدمون المحطات في جميع أنحاء المقاطعة. أما اليوم، فلا يوجد سوى خمسة مهندسين. هؤلاء المهندسون الخمسة مكلفون بتقييم وإعادة بناء شبكة الكهرباء التي دُمرت بالكامل تقريبًا. وتشير التقديرات إلى أن كابلات نحاسية نُهبت من المنطقة خلال الحرب بقيمة مليوني دولار، كما دُمر 70% من أبراج الكهرباء جراء القتال، واحتاجت جميع محولات المدينة تقريبًا إلى الإصلاح أو الاستبدال. ونظرًا لميزانية القسم المحدودة للغاية، فقد اضطر إلى استبدال خطوط النحاس القديمة بكابلات ألومنيوم - أرخص بكثير، ولكنها أكثر عرضة لتقلبات الطقس الصحراوي القاسية. وبينما كان عمر كابلات النحاس القديمة 20 عامًا، ستحتاج كابلات الألومنيوم الجديدة إلى الاستبدال مرة أخرى بعد عامين أو ثلاثة أعوام فقط. وبحلول هذا الصيف، تم إصلاح جزء كافٍ من شبكة المدينة لتلبية الاحتياجات الأساسية للعائدين، لكن مدن المقاطعة الأخرى، مثل السخنة، لا تزال تعاني من انقطاع التيار الكهربائي بشكل كبير.

لم يكن حال مدارس تدمر أفضل حالاً تحت الاحتلال. فقد تم ترميم أربع مدارس فقط من أصل ستين مدرسة في المدينة، وهو عدد لا يكفي حتى لاستيعاب العدد الحالي من العائدين. ونتيجة لذلك، تم تقليص مدة الحصص الدراسية وتقسيمها إلى فترتين صباحية ومسائية، وتضاعف عدد الطلاب في كل فصل. وبذلك، تحولت أربع مدارس إلى ستة عشرة مدرسة، ولكن على حساب الإرهاق الشديد للمعلمين وتدني جودة التعليم. وحتى هذا الصيف، اقتصرت جميع جهود إعادة تأهيل المدارس على مدينة تدمر. ويضطر أطفال القرى المحيطة إلى قطع كيلومترات عديدة سيراً على الأقدام عبر الصحراء المفتوحة يومياً للوصول إلى المدينة، ويتعرضون أحياناً لهجمات الكلاب البرية، فضلاً عن خطر الموت بسبب الألغام الأرضية.

يقول لي مدير إدارة التعليم في تدمر: “لم يحصل الكثير من الأطفال على التعليم خلال الحرب، وتخلفوا عن ركب التعليم. والطلاب الذين قدموا إلى هنا من تركيا غالباً لا يتقنون اللغة العربية، لذا علينا أن نبدأ من الأساسيات”. تحتاج تدمر إلى معلمين متخصصين لسد النقص الناجم عن الحرب والنزوح، ولكن كما هو الحال في القطاع الصحي، يصعب توظيف المزيد من الكوادر. في السخنة، ثاني أكبر مدينة في المنطقة، لجأت العائلات إلى التعليم المنزلي الجماعي لتوفير مستوى أساسي من التعليم على الأقل. لكن آلاف الأشخاص يعيشون في عشرات القرى والنجوع الأخرى في ريف تدمر، ولا يحصل أي منهم حالياً على مدارس أو رعاية صحية.

يُقوّض الدمار الواسع النطاق في المدينة جهود التعافي الاقتصادي. شهدت تدمر هذا الصيف أول انتشار لشرطة السياحة السورية الجديدة في مواقعها الأثرية. ورغم توافد المجموعات السياحية منذ مطلع عام 2025، لم تجني المدينة سوى القليل من الفوائد الاقتصادية. لا تزال معظم الفنادق والمقاهي والمطاعم مدمرة، مما يترك بنية تحتية ضعيفة لاستيعاب عشرات الآلاف من السياح الذين زاروا المدينة خلال العام ونصف العام الماضيين. فندقان فقط من أصل 40 فندقًا يعملان حاليًا، ولا توجد حتى دورات مياه عامة في المدينة.

العدالة الانتقالية المحفوفة بالمخاطر

إن الخسائر البشرية التي خلفتها سنوات الحرب الأربع عشرة الماضية تتجاوز الدمار المادي. فعلى مشارف المدينة يقع سجن تدمر، أحد أسوأ مراكز الاعتقال التابعة لنظام الأسد، حيث تعرض المعتقلون السياسيون للتعذيب والإعدام . في عام ١٩٨٠، أعدمت قوات النظام أكثر من ألف سجين سياسي في هذا السجن في يوم واحد. كما قُتل مئات آخرون من سكان المدينة في معارك الثورة، أو اختفوا في متاهة مراكز الاعتقال التابعة للنظام.

كانت تدمر من أوائل المدن التي شهدت احتجاجات مناهضة للنظام، وكان أغلب سكانها مؤيدين للثورة. ومع ذلك، وكما هو الحال في كل مدينة سنية، كان للنظام مؤيدون. عمل بعض السكان المحليين كمخبرين، بينما انضم آخرون لاحقًا إلى ميليشيات قوات الدفاع الوطني التابعة للنظام. أصبحت تدمر مركزًا لمقاتلي قوات الدفاع الوطني المرتبطين بالقبائل، والذين نشطوا في جميع أنحاء البادية لما يقرب من عقد من الزمان. تركزت معظم أنشطتهم ضد تنظيم داعش، ولكن كما هو الحال مع جميع ميليشيات النظام، ارتكبت جرائم ضد السكان المحليين أيضًا.

أصبحت محاسبة مؤيدي النظام السابق موضوعًا شائكًا في تدمر والسخنة المجاورة لها خلال العام الماضي. في البداية، اتهم نشطاء محليون الحكومة السورية الجديدة بحماية رجال أعمال محليين مولوا قوات الدفاع الوطني. وقُدمت شكاوى قانونية ونُشرت أسماء رجال ما زالوا يعيشون في المدينة وكانوا أعضاءً في هذه الميليشيات، إلا أنهم ظلوا طلقاء. في أكتوبر/تشرين الأول 2025، بدأ السكان بتنظيم احتجاجات أسبوعية للمطالبة برحيل الشبيحة. واستمرت هذه الاحتجاجات لمدة شهرين دون أي رد فعل من الحكومة أو من أعضاء النظام السابق.

ثم بدأت عمليات القتل. خلال يومين في أواخر ديسمبر، اغتيل ثلاثة من عناصر الميليشيات التابعة للنظام السابق في المدينة. وأعقب عمليات القتل في اليوم التالي إعلانٌ عام، نُشر بشكل مجهول في العديد من الصحف المحلية البارزة، جاء فيه :

“مصير كل خائن وكل عميل : الدم الدم ...... والقتل القتل. ولكم عبرة بالذين تم قتلهم خلال اليومين الماضيين ثأراً لله ورسوله ولدماء المسلمين الأبرياء : العميل سهيل الكبة ، العميل راكان العابورة ، العميل مختار السعيد. رسالتنا الثانية : إلى كل من يتعاون مع الفلول ولو بكلمة ولو في بيع أو شراء أو حتى جلوس أو غيره القتل لهم قادم والموت يترقبهم فلا تكن في صفهم الرصاص الذي يثور لن يميز بينك وبينهم.”

بعد شهرين، تصاعدت التوترات مجدداً، حيث طالب المتظاهرون من مساجد المدينة “بقايا النظام السابق” بمغادرة المدينة خلال 24 ساعة. وفي اليوم التالي، أطلق مسلحون صاروخاً على منزل عائلة مرتبطة بميليشيات النظام. وأدت الاحتجاجات والهجمات إلى عقد اجتماع على مستوى المدينة بين إدارة المنطقة ومسؤولين عسكريين وأمنيين. ووفقاً لوسائل الإعلام المحلية ، فقد اجتمع المسؤولون في الاجتماع:

“مع الاعتماد على مسار الدولة والقانون كمرجعية أساسية في معالجة التحديات، والاستماع إلى المطالب المحقّة للأهالي والعمل على معالجتها ضمن الأطر القانونية والتأكيد على التمسك بالثوابت الثورية ومحاسبة المجرمين، بما يرسّخ الاستقرار ويحفظ السلامة العامة.”

بحسب ناشط محلي يعمل في مجال العدالة الانتقالية، أسفرت عمليات القتل التي وقعت أواخر ديسمبر/كانون الأول والاحتجاجات التي اندلعت في فبراير/شباط عن مغادرة العديد من العائلات المرتبطة بالنظام مدينة تدمر. ومع ذلك، فمع استمرار عودة العائلات النازحة إلى تدمر، يعود معها أيضاً أولئك الذين كانت لهم صلات سابقة بنظام الأسد. اندلعت احتجاجات متجددة في تدمر وسط الاحتجاجات الوطنية المناهضة للشبيحة في منتصف يونيو/حزيران. هذه المرة، اشتبك شقيقان عادا مؤخراً، كانا قد خدما في ميليشيات النظام، مع المتظاهرين. أُلقي القبض على الرجلين، لكن التوترات والمظالم لا تزال قائمة. لخصت وسائل الإعلام المحلية، المؤيدة بشدة للاحتجاجات، الموقف قائلة : “لا استقرار بدون عدالة؛ لن نسمح لمن نهبوا ثروات تدمر ودمروا المدينة بالإفلات من العقاب”.

تأمين الصحراء

تتولى إدارة هذه التوترات الاجتماعية المعقدة مجموعة من القوات الأمنية والعسكرية المختلفة. وتوجد اليوم ثلاث قواعد نفوذ في قضاء تدمر: الشرطة العسكرية، ومديرية الأمن الداخلي في البادية، والجيش. وكثيراً ما تُستخدم الشرطة العسكرية لفضّ النزاعات بين العائلات في المدينة، نظراً لأن العديد من رجال هذه العائلات يخدمون حالياً في الوحدات العسكرية المحلية.

تتولى مديرية الأمن الداخلي في البادية مسؤولية الإشراف على جميع عمليات الشرطة والأمن في جميع أنحاء البادية، بما في ذلك المناطق الحضرية والصحراوية. وتشارك هذه المديرية في أعمال الشرطة الاعتيادية، بالإضافة إلى تأمين الطرق النائية في البادية من المجرمين وخلايا تنظيم داعش المحتملة. ونظرًا لحجم هذه المهمة، صنّفت وزارة الداخلية السورية الجديدة البادية كمحافظة ^{خامسة عشرة في سوريا} ، ما رفع مستوى مديرية البادية إلى مستوى مديريات المحافظات الأخرى، ومنحها بذلك موارد وقدرات موسعة للتنسيق مع المؤسسات الأمنية والاستخباراتية الأخرى.

ومع ذلك، يتطلب تأمين هذه المنطقة الشاسعة قوة بشرية كبيرة وخبرة واسعة، وتعاني المديرية من نقص حاد في الموارد. ووفقًا لمسؤول أمني رفيع المستوى، فإن أكبر التحديات التي تواجه المديرية هي نقص الأفراد والتدريب، بالإضافة إلى ضعف البنية التحتية مما يجعل التواصل والتنقل عبر 430 كيلومترًا من الطرق أمرًا صعبًا.

داخل المدن، تُنسق الجهود الأمنية مع الإدارة المحلية للحد من مخاطر النزاعات الاجتماعية. فعلى سبيل المثال، تُغلق بعض مناطق مدينة تدمر مساء كل جمعة أمام الدراجات النارية والرجال غير المتزوجين، مما يوفر أماكن آمنة للعائلات والنساء للتجمع في المناسبات الاجتماعية دون خطر تصاعد الخلافات إلى صراعات عنيفة.

مستقبل جديد

ستعاد أهالي تدمر مدينتهم بعد عقود من احتلال النظام. ويقف سجن تدمر سيئ السمعة الآن مهجورًا صامتًا. وتعمل الإدارة المحلية بتعاون وثيق مع السكان، وأصبحت قوات الأمن تخدم الشعب بدلًا من ترهيبه. وتسعى تدمر اليوم إلى إعادة بناء أسسها المادية والاجتماعية. إلا أن التوترات لا تزال قائمة بسبب استمرار وجود عناصر النظام السابقين، والتي تغذيها التذكيرات الدائمة بوحشية النظام في المباني المدمرة في كل شارع.

في أواخر يوليو/تموز، اجتمعت مديرية أمن البادية، وضباط عسكريون محليون، والإدارة المحلية مع قادة المجتمع، واتفقوا على تشكيل “لجنة من الشخصيات البارزة” تضم عشرة أعضاء. ووفقًا لموقع “ سوريا في مرحلة انتقالية “ ، فإن اللجنة مكلفة بالتوسط في النزاعات والاتهامات المتعلقة بالتعاون مع نظام الأسد. وهي مبادرة محلية المنشأ، تم إرساؤها تحت مظلة الدولة والقانون.

لدينا الكثير من العمل لننجزه بأقل قدر من التمويل"، هكذا أخبرني ساهر هذا الربيع بعد أن شرح لي جميع التحديات التي تواجه المدينة، "يمكننا تأجيل أعمال التنظيف، لكن ليس التعليم والرعاية الصحية". في العاشر من أغسطس، أعلن الرئيس شرع عن تخصيص مليون دولار من منحة كويتية كبيرة لدعم مستشفى تدمر. تُعد هذه خطوة مهمة نحو مساعدة هذه المنطقة النائية التي تُشكل جسراً بين شرق سوريا وغربها. لكن بناء أسس مستقبل تدمر يتطلب جهوداً منسقة بالكامل بين الحكومة والمنظمات الدولية، لدعم أهالي تدمر وهم ينهضون من جديد.

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One room in an old government office amid the ancient Temple of Bel is marked, “Snipers Headquarters.” Inside, the walls are adorned with Islamic State slogans and names. In the floor above, there is room labeled with one of Assad’s intelligence forces, “The Counter Terrorism Unit.” It is surrounded by religious verses and slogans of Shia militias from Iraq and Lebanon. To the east, a once impressive hotel complex lays in ruins. Yet barely faded on its walls are large, carefully painted slogans in Farsi honoring the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division. Just north of the ancient ruins, on the edge of Palmyra city, seven piles of twisted concrete and rebar lay clustered together – the remnants of an Israeli airstrike on an Iranian headquarters in the waning days of the Assad regime.

Assad, then ISIS, Iran, Russia, and Shia jihadists from abroad all tried to rule this ancient city. Now they are gone. For years Palmyra was a battered coffin – its residents almost entirely displaced, its homes, schools, mosques, and churches destroyed and looted and what buildings remained turned into military barracks. When the regime fell on December 8, 2024, the people of Palmyra and the surrounding areas began to return. They quickly organized a new local administrative body and started to rebuild their city, even as the new Syrian state was still forming.

Palmyra was, and remains, the administrative and economic center of the Syrian Badia, a vast array of steppes, desert, dry river beds and gaunt mountains lying between Damascus and the Euphrates River. Hundreds of miles of paved and unpaved roads connect the Badia’s distant towns with each other. Nine towns and dozens of formal and informal hamlets fall under the Palmyra District. Urban tradesmen and farmers living alongside nomadic Bedouin tribes. Nearly forgotten amid the mass destruction across all of Syria, it is Palmyra’s people who have begun to rebuild their ancient city.

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Returning Basic Services

Reconstructing this vast expanse of interlinked communities after 14 years of war and decades of neglect has fallen on just a small number of under-supported locals. Saher al-Saghir was among the first to return to Palmyra from the refugee camps in northern Syria after the regime fell. He quickly set about organizing a basic local administration; fundraising for and re-establishing basic serves, resolving disputes and supporting families returning to destroyed homes. The community quickly rallied around him and in August 2025 he was officially appointed the Director of the Palmyra District. “Saher will work with anyone who can help the people of Palmyra, he only cares about serving these areas,” one local activist told me.

Yet he and his team face a daunting challenge. “Palmyra city was a military area until the end of the war,” Saher tells me in his office earlier this spring. “The city was completely destroyed and very few residents remained.” Russians, Iranians, Afghans, Iraqis, and Syrian regime forces had all divided control of the remaining buildings, establishing small bases for each of their factions. These forces planted hundreds of thousands of landmines across the city and its countryside, each using their own maps and plans leaving behind no centralized database. Since the liberation, engineers from the new Syrian army, Civil Defense personnel, as well as locals in private initiatives, have removed 50,000 mines from Palmyra District. Thirty army and civil defense engineers have been killed in the process, while more than 100 civilians have died to mines here in just one and a half years.

For nearly a decade, Palmyra had been the frontline of the desert war between ISIS and the Syrian regime. The city itself had exchanged hands several times before regime forces took final control in 2017, but the countryside remained contested until the regime fell. As a result, everything in the city had been hit multiple times by air and artillery strikes. Infrastructure is completely destroyed, schools and hospitals lie in ruin, and the large historic oasis outside the city known as al-Waha is heavily burned. Local officials estimate that 20% of the city was fully destroyed by December 2024, the rest of the buildings looted and suffering at least partial damage that required reconstruction before habitation.

These rebuilding efforts have been almost entirely locally led. Around 50,000 people, one third of the city’s population, have returned from the camps in Syria’s north. But leaving the camps meant leaving behind basic services like healthcare, electricity, schools, and water. None of this was available in Palmyra when the regime fell. Saher and his small team of dedicated managers have worked tirelessly to change this.

Basic infrastructure within Palmyra city was gradually restored over 2025, but still remains extremely limited and weak. All medical equipment had been looted by the regime, and while returnees had repaired the hospital and bought new equipment, they face a daunting staffing shortage. Palmyra’s hospital, serving the city and every village in the 30,000 square kilometers of the Palmyra District, has only one doctor and a handful of nurses. Low salaries, an arduous multi-hour journey from Homs city, and lack of housing has prevented other doctors from working in the city. On top of regular medical issues, this doctor and his small staff must deal with mine injuries and severe traffic accidents caused by the heavily damaged roads. Any serious injury requiring specialist care means traveling over two hours to Homs City – even further if they are living in one of the other towns in Palmyra District.

The medical department is not the only understaffed service department in Palmyra. Before the war, the Palmyra District Electrical Department had 80 workers servicing stations across the entire district. Today there are just five. These five engineers are tasked with assessing and rebuilding an almost completely destroyed electrical grid. An estimated two million dollars’ worth of copper cabling was looted from the area during the war, 70% of the electrical pylons were destroyed by fighting, and almost all of the city’s converters needed repair or replacement. Operating on a shoe string budget, the department has had to replace the old copper lines with aluminum cables – much cheaper, but far more susceptible to the desert’s extreme weather. While the old copper cables had a 20-year lifespan, these new aluminum cables will need to be replaced again after just two to three years. Just enough of the city’s grid had been repaired by this summer to cover the returnees’ basic needs, but the district’s other towns, like Sukhnah, are still largely without power.

Palmyra’s schools faired no better under the regime’s occupation. Four of the city’s 60 schools have been repaired, not nearly enough to provide for even the current number of returnees. As a result, classes have been shortened and divided into morning and afternoon shifts, and each class doubled in size. In effect, this has turned four schools into 16, but at the cost of an extreme strain on the teachers and reduced quality of education. Up until this summer, all school rehabilitation efforts have been isolated to Palmyra city. Children from the outlying villages have to walk several kilometers through open desert each day to reach the city, sometimes being attacked by packs of wild dogs and risking death from landmines.

“So many children did not get an education during the war and have fallen behind,” the director of Palmyra’s education department tells me. “And students who came here from Turkey often don’t have good Arabic, so we need to start from the basics.” Palmyra needs specialized teachers to fill the gaps caused by war and displacement, but like with the health sector, it is difficult to hire more staff. In Sukhnah, the second largest town in the district, families have resorted to group home schooling in order to provide at least some basic level of education. But thousands of people live across dozens of other villages and hamlets in Palmyra’s countryside, none of whom currently have access to schools or healthcare.

The broader destruction in the city is also undermining economic recovery efforts. This summer, Palmyra saw its first deployment of Syria’s new Tourism Police to its ancient sites. Yet while tour groups have been arriving here since early 2025, the city has reaped little economic benefit. Most of the hotels, cafes, and restaurants remain destroyed, leaving little infrastructure to support the tens of thousands of tourists who have visited over the past year and a half. Only two out of 40 hotels are currently functional and there are not even any public bathrooms in the city.

Fraught Transitional Justice

More than the physical destruction is the human cost to the past 14 years of war. On the city’s outskirts lies the Tadmur Prison, one of the Assad regime’s most infamous detention centers where political detainees were tortured and executed. In 1980, regime forces executed more than 1,000 political prisoners here in a single day. Hundreds more of the city’s residents were killed in fighting during the revolution or disappeared into the matrix of regime detention facilities.

Palmyra was among the earlier cities to hold anti-regime protests and was overwhelming on the side of the revolution. Still, like every Sunni town, the regime had its supporters. Some local men worked as informants while others would in later years join the regime’s National Defense Forces militia. Palmyra would become a hub of tribal-linked NDF fighters operating across the Badia for nearly a decade. Most of their activity was against ISIS, but as with all regime militias, crimes were committed against local residents as well.

Holding these former regime supporters accountable has become a contentious topic in Palmyra and neighboring Sukhnah over the course of the past year. At first, local activists accused the new Syrian government of protecting local businessmen who had funded the NDF. Legal complaints were filed and names published of men still living in the city who had been members of these militias. Yet they remained free. In October 2025, residents began holding weekly protests calling for the “shabiha” to leave. This went on for two months with no response from the government or the ex-regime members.

Then the killings began. Over a two-day period in late December, three former regime militiamen were assassinated in the city. The killings were followed a day later by a public announcement, shared anonymously with several prominent local new pages, stating:

“Our message to every regime thug, the fate of every traitor and every agent: Blood for blood... and killing for killing. Take a lesson from those who were killed in the past two days. In revenge for God and His Messenger and for the blood of innocent Muslims: The agent Suhail Al-Kubba, the agent Rakan Al-Aboura, the agent Mukhtar Al-Saeed.

Our second message: To everyone who cooperates with the regime’s remnants, even with a word, or in buying or selling, or even sitting with them, or anything else: Death is coming for them, and death awaits them, so do not be on their side. The bullets that will be fired will not distinguish between you and them.”

Two months later, tensions erupted again with protestors issuing a demand from the city’s mosques that “remnants of the former regime” had 24 hours to leave the city. The next day armed men fired a rocket at the house of a family linked to regime militias. The protests and attacks triggered a city-wide meeting between the district administration and military and security officials. According to local media, the gathered officials,:

“…stressed the importance of adhering to the state and the rule of law as the primary framework for addressing challenges, listening to the legitimate demands of the residents and working to address them within the legal framework, and upholding revolutionary principles while holding criminals accountable, thereby consolidating stability and preserving public safety.”

According to one local activist working on transitional justice issues, the killings in late December and protests in February resulted in many of the regime-linked families leaving the city. However, as displaced families continue to return to Palmyra, so to do those with former links to the Assad regime. Renewed protests erupted in Palmyra amid the nation-wide anti-shabiha protests in mid-June. This time, two recently returned brothers who had served in regime militias clashed with the protestors. The men were arrested, but the tensions and grievances remain. Local media, highly supportive of the protests, summarized the sentiment: “There is no stability without justice; we will not allow those who plundered Palmyra’s wealth and destroyed the city to escape punishment.”

Securing the Desert

Tasked with managing these complex social tensions is a mix of various security and military forces. There are three power bases in the Palmyra District today: the Military Police, the Badia Internal Security Directorate, and the army. The Military Police are often used to break up fights between families in the city, given that many of the men in these families are currently serving in the local military units.

The Badia Internal Security Directorate is tasked with overseeing all policing and security operations across the entire Badia: its urban areas and desert. This directorate is engaged in regular police work as well as securing the remote Badia roads from criminals and potential ISIS cells. Given the scale of this task, Syria’s new Ministry of Interior has designated the Badia as Syria’s 15^th governorate, elevating the Badia Directorate to the same level as other governorate directorates and thus granting it expanded resources and capabilities to coordinate with other security and intelligence institutions.

Yet securing this vast area requires significant manpower and expertise, and the directorate has many resource shortfalls. According to a senior security official, the directorate’s biggest challenges are a lack of personnel and training, as well as weak infrastructure which makes communication and movements across 430 kilometers of roadway difficult.

Within the cities, security efforts are coordinated with the local administration in order to reduce the risk of social conflicts. For example, on Friday evenings, certain parts of Palmyra city are closed off to motorcycles and single men, providing safe places for families and women to gather for social events without the risk of disputes escalating into violent conflicts.

A New Future

The people of Palmyra have reclaimed their city after decades of regime occupation. The infamous Tadmur Prison now stands empty and silent. The local administration works closely with the residents and the security forces now serve the people, rather than terrorize them. Today, Palmyra is attempting to rebuild its physical and social foundations. Yet tensions over the continued presence of ex-regime members remains, fueled by the constant reminder of the regime’s barbarity in the shattered buildings on every street.

In late July, the Badia Security Directorate, local military officers, and the local administration met with community leaders and agreed to form a ten-person “Committee of Notables.” According to Syria In Transition, the committee is tasked with mediating disputes and accusations over collaboration with the Assad regime. A locally-rooted initiative brought under the umbrella of the state and law.

“We have a lot of work to do with only a bare minimum of funds,” Saher tells me this spring after explaining all of the city’s challenges, “we can wait on cleaning, but not education and healthcare.” On August 10, President Sharaa announced $1,000,000 from a larger Kuwaiti grant would be directed to support Palmyra’s hospital. It is an important step forward to helping this remote region which serves as the bridge between Syria’s east and west. But building the foundations for Palmyra’s future requires a fully coordinated effort between the government and international organization, all supporting the people of Palmyra as they rise up once more.

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